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Estimating Risk Preferences
in the Field†
Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Ted O’Donoghue,
and Joshua C. Teitelbaum*
We survey the literature on estimating risk preferences using field data. We
concentrate our attention on studies in which risk preferences are the focal object and
estimating their structure is the core enterprise. We review a number of models of risk
preferences—including both expected utility (EU) theory and non-EU models—that
have been estimated using field data, and we highlight issues related to identification
and estimation of such models using field data. We then survey the literature, giving
separate treatment to research that uses individual-level data (e.g., property-insurance
data) and research that uses aggregate data (e.g., betting-market data). We conclude
by discussing directions for future research. ( JEL C51, D11, D81, D82, D83, G22,
I13)

1.

and 
public 
economics, particularly in the
study of incentives and social insurance
programs. And risk preferences are a major
driver in models of consumption, investment, and asset pricing in macroeconomics.
While much of the literature is theoretical
in nature, deriving qualitative predictions
in different environments, there is also a
large empirical literature that estimates risk
preferences, both their magnitude and their
nature.
Most of the literature uses expected utility (EU) theory to model risk preferences.
Under EU theory, there are two potential
sources of variation in attitudes toward risk:
people might differ in (i) their degree of
diminishing marginal utility for wealth (their
utility curvature), or (ii) their subjective
beliefs. Over the years, however, economists
have come to recognize additional sources of

Introduction

R

isk preferences are integral to modern economics. They are the primary
focus of the literature on decision making
under uncertainty. They play a central role
in insurance and financial economics. The
topics of risk sharing and insurance are
prominent in development, health, labor,
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variation in attitudes toward risk, and have
integrated these into “non-EU” models. The
most prominent of these additional sources
are (iii) probability distortions (such as in
rank-dependent EU) and (iv) reference-dependent utility (as in loss aversion).
Early empirical studies on risk preferences
focus on the EU model and rely on data
from laboratory experiments (e.g., Preston
and Baratta 1948; Yaari 1965); for reviews,
see Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000).
Laboratory experiments generated many
insights about risk preferences, and most
notably demonstrated both substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences and substantial deviations from EU theory. However,
the limitations commonly associated with
the laboratory setting—e.g., concerns about
ecological and external validity—motivated
economists to look for suitable data from
field settings—i.e., environments in which
people’s real-world economic behavior is
observable.
As a result, there is a relatively small but
growing literature that takes on the difficult
task of estimating risk preferences using
field data. Our goal in this review is to survey and assess this literature, with a particular emphasis on clarifying the differences
among potential sources of variation in risk
attitudes and highlighting how one might
tease them apart. We concentrate our attention on studies in which risk preferences are
the focal object and estimating their structure is the core enterprise. In particular,
we generally exclude papers that estimate a
structural model of risk preferences, but do
not treat the risk preference parameters as
the parameters of main interest. Although
there are many excellent papers in this category that make important contributions
to numerous fields of economics, they are
beyond the scope of this review.1

We begin in section 2 with a motivating
example designed to address the question
of why economists should care about the
structure of risk preferences. More and
more, economists are engaging in analyses
that investigate the quantitative impact of a
change in the underlying environment (e.g.,
a legal reform). In such analyses, risk preferences are often a required input, even if
only as part of a broader model. Our example highlights two reasons that the specification of risk preferences matters. First, many
quantitative analyses attempt to make outof-sample predictions for behavior based on
the broader model. We demonstrate in our
example how different assumptions about
risk preferences can lead to different outof-sample predictions for behavior. Second,
many quantitative analyses attempt to reach
welfare conclusions. We discuss how different assumptions about risk preferences can
lead to different welfare conclusions.
In section 3, we provide a detailed review
of several models of risk preferences.
Section 3 does not contain an exhaustive list
of all models of risk preferences, but rather
focuses on those that have been estimated or
otherwise studied using field data. We begin
with EU theory, and proceed to describe
several non-EU models that were originally motivated by experimental evidence,
but which subsequently have been studied
using field data, including rank-dependent
expected utility (RDEU) theory and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). In section 4, we
then provide a discussion of identification,
and in particular describe what types of data
are needed to estimate and distinguish the
various models.
In section 5, we discuss research that
estimates risk preferences, and sometimes
heterogeneity in risk preferences, using individual-level data. We begin with an overview

1 As we explain below, however, we discuss a handful
of papers that, although they fall into this category, make

valuable contributions to the methodology of estimating
risk preferences using field data.
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of the general approach used throughout the
literature. Next, we describe in detail research
that estimates risk preferences using data on
property-insurance choices. We then briefly
discuss studies that use data from television
game shows. Lastly, we review a handful of
recent papers that analyze data on health-insurance choices. Although health insurance
is an important field context, we limit the
depth of our coverage because the papers
that use health-insurance data do not focus
on estimating risk preferences. We believe
this is because estimating risk preferences
using health-insurance data is especially
challenging. Nevertheless, we highlight a
few recent papers that address some of these
challenges and whose contributions could
facilitate future work that focuses on estimating risk preferences.
In section 6, we turn to research that
estimates risk preferences, and sometimes
heterogeneity in risk preferences, using
market-level, or aggregate, data. Once again,
we begin with an overview of the general
approach of the literature, highlighting how
the use of aggregate data naturally requires
a stronger set of assumptions in order to
identify risk preferences. Next, we describe
in detail research that estimates risk preferences using data on betting markets, specifically data on betting in pari-mutuel horse
races. We then discuss a select assortment
of papers that use macroeconomic data to
estimate risk preferences, including data on
consumption and investment (asset returns)
and on labor supply.
Finally, in section 7 we discuss a number of
directions for future research. An under-researched issue is the extent to which risk preferences are stable across contexts. We review
the few studies that use field data to investigate this issue, and we highlight the questions left open by these studies. Relatedly,
we also discuss the possibility of combining
data from laboratory and field settings in
order to paint a more complete picture of
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risk 
preferences—and also to gain insight
on the question of whether experimental
results can be directly applied to make field
predictions. Next, we describe the recent literature on using surveys to measure risk perceptions, and we discuss the extent to which
survey data might be usefully combined with
field data to identify and estimate risk preferences under weaker assumptions. Finally, we
discuss the importance of “mental accounting,” by which we mean assumptions about
how people translate a complex field context
into a set of concrete lotteries to be evaluated. We encourage future research to pay
more careful attention to such assumptions.
2.

Motivating Example

In this section, we present a stylized
example designed to motivate why economists should care about the structure of risk
preferences. The setting of our example is a
hypothetical insurance market. We make a
number of strong assumptions—about the
setting and the data—that make identification and estimation more straightforward.
In later sections, we highlight some of the
identification and estimation challenges
that economists face in more realistic field
settings.
Imagine that there is a continuum of households of measure one who each face the possibility of a loss L
 that occurs with probability
μ. Both Land μare the same across households, and their values are fixed and known.2
To fix ideas, let L = 10,000and μ = 0.05.
There is insurance available to the households—full insurance at a price p. Moreover,
there is sufficient exogenous price variation
(e.g., over time or across various identical subsets of the households; see Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen 2010 for an example) to nonparametrically identify the m
 arket-demand
2 Note that by assuming μis fixed, we are abstracting
from moral hazard.
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function for full insurance, 
Q  F  (p), which
returns the fraction of households willing to
purchase full insurance at price p. Panel A of
figure 1 depicts one such demand function,
namely Q  F  (p)   = 2 − 0.001p. It is a typical
demand function—as the price of insurance
decreases, the fraction of households willing
to purchase it increases. It also reflects aversion to risk—households demand insurance
at actuarially unfair prices.
2.1 Out-of-Sample Predictions
Understanding the underlying structure
of risk preferences matters for making outof-sample predictions. Consider a regulatory
proposal to require all insurance policies to
carry a deductible d
 < L. In order to assess
this proposal, we need to know how the
demand for insurance would respond to the
introduction of the deductible d. The demand
function for full insurance Q  F  (p)—which we
observe—provides, by itself, limited information about the market-demand function
for deductible insurance, Q 
 D  (p). However,
if we know the underlying model that gen, we can use that model to
erates Q  F  (p)
construct Q  D  (p).
Assume for the moment that the underlying model is EU. In addition, assume
that (i) the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), specifically u(y) = − exp (−ry)/r, where ris the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion; and
(ii) the slope of the demand function Q 
 D  (p)
arises from heterogeneity in r. Given these
assumptions, we can recover the population
distribution of r , denoted FE  U, from the market-demand function Q 
 F  (p). Observe that a
household’s willingness to pay for full insurance is the zsuch that3
(1)	exp (rz)   = μ exp (rL)  + (1 − μ) .
3 For an arbitrary utility function, zis defined implicitly
by u(w − z)   = μu(w − L)  + (1 − μ) u(w), where wis the
household’s status quo wealth.

Equation (1) defines r  F  (z)—the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion of a household
with willingness to pay zfor full insurance.
A household purchases full insurance when
its r > r  F  (p), and hence the demand for full
    ( r  F  (p)).
insurance satisfies Q  F  (p) = 1 − FEU
F
It follows that, given Q 
   (p), we can recover
F EU. Panel B of figure 1 displays the F EU
that corresponds to the Q 
 F  (p)depicted in
panel A.
Given FE  U, it is straightforward to construct the demand for deductible insurance
Q  D  (p). A household’s willingness to pay for
deductible insurance is the zsuch that
(2) 
μ exp (r(z + d)) + (1 − μ) exp (rz)  
    = μ exp (rL)  + (1 − μ) .
Equation (2) defines r  D  (z)—the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion of a household with
willingness to pay 
zfor deductible insurance. A household purchases deductible
, and hence
insurance when its r > r  D  (p)
the demand for deductible insurance is
QE  DU  (p)   = 1 − FE  U  ( r  D  (p)). Panel C of figure 1 depicts the Q 
 EDU (p)that corresponds
F
to the Q 
   (p)depicted in panel A, assuming
d = 2,500
. Because deductible insurance
provides less coverage than full insurance,
naturally QE  DU (p)   < Q  F  (p).
Making a different assumption about the
underlying model, however, can lead to different predictions about the level of demand for
deductible insurance. Suppose, for example,
that the underlying model is the probability
distortion model featured in Barseghyan et
al. (2013b). The probability distortion model
posits that households, instead of weighting
outcomes by their objective probabilities,
weight outcomes using distorted probabilities.4 Under the probability distortion model

4 In the setting of our example, such probability distortions can emerge from several prominent alternative
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Panel A: Demand for full insurance
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Panel C: Demand for deductible insurance
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Figure 1. Demand for Insurance and Underlying Risk Preferences

(and maintaining the additional assumptions
specified above), a household’s willingness to
pay for full insurance is the z such that
(3) exp (rz)   = Ω(μ) exp (rL)  + (1 − Ω(μ)) , 
where Ω(μ)is the weight on the loss outcome. Suppose that Ω
 (μ) = Ω̅   > μis the
same across households, and that Ω̅  is known.
models of choice under risk. See section 4.4 for further
discussion.

Given Ω̅ , we can proceed as before to use
the known demand for full insurance Q  F  (p)
to construct the counterfactual demand for
deductible insurance Q ΩD    (p).
Let FΩ
  denote the distribution of r
given the probability distortion model
with loss weight 
Ω̅ 
. We can recover 
F Ω
from the demand for full insurance,
    ( r ΩF    (p)), where r ΩF    (z) is
Q  F  (p)   = 1 − FΩ
defined by equation (3) with Ω
 (μ)   = Ω̅ .
Panel B of figure 1 displays the F 
 Ω that corresponds to the Q 
 F  (p)depicted in panel A,
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assuming Ω  ̅ = 0.10. Given FΩ
  , we can
construct the demand for deductible insur    ( r ΩD    (p)), where r ΩD    (z)
ance, QΩ
  D    (p)   = 1 − FΩ
is defined by
  
Ω̅   exp (r(z + d))  + (1 − Ω̅ ) exp (rz)
    = Ω̅   exp (rL)  + (1 − Ω̅ ),
the equation that implicitly defines a household’s willingness to pay 
zfor deductible
insurance. Panel C of figure 1 depicts
 F(p)
the QΩ
  D    (p)that corresponds to the Q 
depicted in panel A, assuming d = 2,500 and
  D  (p).
Ω̅   = 0.10. Observe that Q 
 ΩD    (p)   < QEU
In short, we see that the two models generate different predictions for the level of
demand for deductible insurance. In particular, the EU model predicts a higher level
of demand than the probability distortion
model. The intuition for this difference
follows from the nature of concave utility.
Under both models, a concave utility function implies that the concern for reducing
risk is stronger the more risk one bears.5
Moreover, this effect becomes stronger as
the concavity of the utility function increases
(i.e., as rgets larger). For a given (observed)
demand for actuarially unfair full insurance,
the concavity of the utility function is greater
under the EU model than under the probability distortion model with Ω
 (μ)   > μ,6 and
thus the implied demand for deductible
insurance is greater under the EU model.

5 Take our example: although the deductible insurance
provides 75 percent of the coverage of full insurance,
under both modes a household’s willingness to pay for the
deductible insurance is greater than 75 percent of the willingness to pay for full insurance (see figure 1).
6 Intuitively, this is because under the EU model a
household’s aversion to risk (which generates its insurance demand) is driven solely by the concavity of its utility
function, whereas under the probability distortion model
a household’s aversion to risk is driven also by the overweighting of its distortion function.

2.2 Welfare Analysis
Understanding the underlying structure of
risk preferences is also important for welfare
analysis. There are two key issues here.
First, when one uses a structural model
of preferences to conduct welfare analysis,
a misspecified model can yield misleading
conclusions. In simple terms, if a misspecified model leads to incorrect out-of-sample
predictions for the behavioral impact of a
policy change (as in the prior subsection),
then of course welfare conclusions will be
misleading. However, even if the misspecified model leads to correct predictions for
the behavioral impact of a particular policy
change, it still can yield misleading conclusions when one uses any welfare analysis
that involves interpersonal utility comparisons (e.g., conducting welfare analysis based
on sum of surplus). In particular, different
underlying models can have different implications for the change in surplus that each
person experiences from a particular policy
change (even while agreeing on the direction
of the change).
Second, economists sometimes conduct
welfare analysis without reference to the
underlying structure of preferences, using
the fact that market demand (or more generally, people’s revealed willingness to pay) can
be a sufficient statistic for consumer welfare.7
For instance, Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen
(2010) propose an approach to empirical welfare analysis in insurance markets that relies
only on estimating the demand function.
However, this type of welfare analysis is valid
only if people’s revealed willingness to pay
is indeed a sufficient statistic for consumer
welfare. The behavioral economics literature
has suggested a variety of reasons people’s
7 Such analyses are confined to within-sample welfare analysis, because without an underlying model of
preferences, one cannot make out-of-sample behavioral
predictions.
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behavior might deviate from what maximizes
their welfare. Indeed, Baicker, Mullainathan,
and Schwartzstein (2015) describe how the
standard revealed-preference approach to
welfare might fail in the context of health
insurance.
The question of whether and, if so, when
we should drop the revealed-preference
assumption in welfare analysis has been hotly
debated—see, in particular, Kőszegi and
Rabin (2008), Bernheim (2009), and Chetty
(2015). Estimating the underlying structure
of preferences can help frame this debate
because the more one understands the
forces that drive behavior, the better one can
assess whether those forces should be given
normative weight. To illustrate in the context
of risk preferences, suppose we estimate that
a probability distortion model (as described
in section 2.1) best explains behavior, and
suppose we are able to further establish that
probability distortions primarily reflect risk
misperceptions (i.e., incorrect subjective
beliefs). We have then reframed the debate
into one about whether we should evaluate
welfare using a person’s (incorrect) subjective beliefs or more objective probabilities.
3.

Models of Risk Preferences

In this section we describe in detail several models of risk preferences. We begin
by reviewing the standard EU model. We
then proceed to introduce several alternative
models. Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive list, but rather to focus on models of risk
preferences that have been prominent in the
literature that uses field data to estimate risk
preferences.8
We start by introducing notation that we
use throughout this section.
8 In the online appendix, we provide further details
about these models and illustrate their differences by
describing their predictions in three examples.
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DEFINITION 1: Let X ≡ (x 1, μ  1; x 2, μ  2; … ;
x N, μ  N)denote a lottery that yields outcome
 N
  μ 
 n  = 1.
x n with probability μ  n, where ∑
n=1
Models of risk preferences describe how a
person chooses among lotteries of this form,
where we often use X to denote a choice set.
Throughout, we express lottery outcomes
in terms of increments added to (or subtracted from) the person’s prior wealth w.
In other words, if outcome x n is realized,
then the person will have final wealth
w + x n. The probabilities should be taken to
be a person’s subjective beliefs. In particular,
the models below describe how a person’s
subjective beliefs impact his or her choices.
The models are silent on the source of those
subjective beliefs—we return to this issue in
section 5.1.
3.1 Expected Utility
According to EU theory, given a choice set
X, a person will choose the option X
 ∈ X that
maximizes
N

	
EU(X)   ≡   ∑  μ  n  u(w + x n),
n=1

where uis a utility function that maps final
wealth onto the real line.
Under EU theory, a person’s attitude
toward risk is fully captured by her utility function u(and her prior wealth w). In
broad terms, a person will be risk averse if u
is concave, risk loving if uis convex, and risk
neutral if uis linear. More narrowly, one can
derive a local measure of absolute or relative
risk aversion (or risk lovingness) that characterizes how a person will react locally to
choices between lotteries.
Hence, when one estimates an EU model,
the main object to estimate is the utility
function u

. As we shall see, occasionally
researchers have taken a nonparametric
approach to estimating u

, but most often
they assume a specific parametric functional
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TABLE 1

Functional Forms Used in this Review
Panel A. Utility functions
CARA

CRRA

HARA

NTD

Panel B. Probability weighting functions
Karmarkar (1978)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)

−  __1r   exp (−ry) for any r ≠ 0
 
  
u(y)   =     
 
{y
for r = 0
___
  1   y  1−ρ for any ρ ≠ 1
1 −  ρ
 
 
u(y)   =    
{ln   y
for ρ = 1

⎧___
y 1−γ
γ
⎪ 
  (η +  __γ )   for any γ ≠ 1
1
−
γ
 
 
  

u(y)   = ⎨   
y
⎪
__
for γ = 1
⎩γ ln(η +   γ )
u(w + Δ)
u′ (w)

ũ (Δ)   ≡  ______
   −  ____   ≅ Δ −  __r   Δ  2 
u(w)
 ′ (w)
u

μ  γ
μ    + (1 − μ)  

π(μ)   =  ________
  
γ
γ
μ  γ

π(μ)   =  ___________
  
  
1/γ
[μ    + (1 − μ)  γ] 
γ

π(μ)   =  _________
  
  
γ
γ

Prelec (1998)

π(μ)   = exp (−(−ln μ)  α)

form for u. Perhaps the most common functional forms are the constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), and the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) families, reported
in panel A of table 1.
When one uses the CARA family, one
estimates the parameter r , which is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (higher 
r
means more risk averse). The CARA family



δ μ  γ
δ μ    + (1 − μ)  

Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992)

Panel C. Value function
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)

2

for y ≥ 0, α ∈ (0, 1)
y  α
v(y)   =     

  
 

{− λ (− y)  β for y < 0, β ∈ (0, 1), λ > 1

implies a person’s prior wealth wis irrelevant
to her choices. This is advantageous from
the econometrician’s viewpoint, because w
frequently is unobserved. At the same time,
however, this is disadvantageous from the
economic theorist’s viewpoint, because economists typically believe that people exhibit
decreasing absolute risk aversion—i.e., as a
person becomes wealthier, she becomes less
averse to risk.

Barseghyan et al.: Estimating Risk Preferences in the Field
When one uses the CRRA family, one
estimates the parameter ρ, which is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (higher ρ
means more risk averse). The CRRA family
has the advantage of implying decreasing
absolute risk aversion (among those who are
risk averse). However, the CRRA family has
the major drawback that it requires prior
wealth was an input. Hence, when researchers use the CRRA family and do not observe
prior wealth, they typically either posit some
reasonable value for prior wealth (and check
robustness for other values) or proxy for
wealth using some aspect of the data (e.g.,
home value).
Finally, when one uses the HARA family, one estimates the parameters η and γ,
which together determine the degree of
absolute risk aversion r(y)   = (η + y / γ)  −1.
The HARA family has the property that it
nests the CARA and CRRA families as special cases, with γ
 → +∞yielding CARA and
η = 0yielding CRRA.9
A third technique is to use an approximation approach; see Cohen and Einav (2007),
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011),
and Barseghyan et al. (2013b). Specifically,
if one takes a second-order Taylor approximation of the utility function around prior
wealth 
wand then normalizes by marginal utility evaluated at prior wealth 
w,
one gets
u(w + Δ)
u′(w)

   −  ____   ≅ Δ −  __r   Δ  2  , 
(4) ũ (Δ)   ≡  _______
2
u(w)
u′(w)

where 
r ≡ −u″(w)/u′(w)is local absolute
risk aversion. This approximation is accurate
when the third- and higher-order derivatives
of the utility function uare negligible, at least
relative to the increments to wealth that are
9 Some researchers—e.g., Cicchetti and Dubin (1994)
and Jullien and Salanié (2000)—assume a simpler HARA
specification u
 (y)   = (η + y)  γ. This simplification necessitates restricting γto lie in the interval ( 0, 1 ].
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relevant in a particular application. As such,
we label this approach the negligible third
derivative (NTD) approach.
The NTD family is convenient to work
with because it does not require prior
wealth as an input. However, one must be
careful to assess whether the approximation
method is appropriate for the particular
application under consideration. This will
depend on the magnitude of the increments
to wealth relative to the estimated degree of
risk aversion.10
3.1.1 Utility Curvature and the Rabin
Critique
As it is usually applied—and as it is
described above—EU theory is defined for
static choices wherein a person faces a single decision problem that involves choosing
between lotteries that add to or subtract
from her initial wealth.11 For such choices,
Rabin (2000) demonstrates that if one
assumes that a person uses the same utility function in every choice—an assumption one would want to make if the theory
is to have any predictive power—then EU
theory is problematic. In particular, Rabin
demonstrates that if a person exhibits any
noticeable risk aversion over small stakes
for a range of initial wealth, then she must
exhibit extremely large risk aversion over
moderate stakes for that same range of initial wealth, so large as to be clearly counterfactual. For instance, if a person rejects
a 50–50 gamble to lose $10 and win $10.10
for any initial wealth, then she must also
reject a 50–50 gamble to lose $1,000 and
win any positive sum, no matter how large.
Because people arguably do exhibit noticeable risk aversion over small stakes, but
10 One obvious concern is that utility must be increasing, which for risk averse individuals (with r > 0) holds
only for Δ < 1 / r.
11 Under EU theory, one can equivalently convert this
problem into a static choice between lotteries defined over
final wealth states.
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also reasonable risk aversion over moderate
stakes, Rabin concludes that EU theory
cannot be a good explanation for b
 ehavior.
This argument is known as the “Rabin
critique.”
Motivated by the Rabin critique, parts of
the empirical literature have focused on calibrational “rejections” of EU theory, by which
they mean a finding of too much utility curvature over small or moderate stakes. In our
review of the literature, we describe some
examples of such calibrational rejections,
where authors conclude that the estimated
degree of utility curvature is “too large.” We
also attempt to clearly distinguish when EU
theory is being rejected for calibrational reasons and when it is being rejected because an
alternative model statistically better explains
the data.
One possible response to the Rabin critique is that the static EU framework is
merely a simplification, as people are in fact
solving dynamic life-cycle problems with
many decisions taking place over time. If
we think of the static EU framework as an
“as-if” way of analyzing one of these many
decisions, it becomes less clear that we
should be applying the same utility function
to every decision that the person makes.
For instance, for some decisions uncertainty resolves quickly (such as horse race
bets or laboratory gambles), while for other
decisions uncertainly resolves more slowly
(such as property-insurance choices), and
thus it is not obvious that the same utility
function should apply to all decisions. It is
an open question how to think about the
comparability of utility functions estimated
in different contexts. We return to this issue
in section 7.1.

In other words, we replace the EU equation
with
N

	
V(X)   ≡   ∑  ω  n  u(w + x n),
n=1

where ω  nis a decision weight associated
with outcome x  nand may not be equal to a
person’s belief μ 
 n. The original idea was proposed by Edwards (1955, 1962) and popularized in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory, which assumes ω 
 n  = π( μ  n).
That is, there is an increasing function π
 —
often labeled a probability weighting function—that transforms each probability into
a decision weight (still normalizing π(0)   = 0
and π(1)   = 1). With this formulation, however, for any π
 (μ)   ≠ μ, it is possible to construct examples in which the theory predicts
violations of stochastic dominance—i.e., that
people would choose a lottery over another
that stochastically dominates it. The source
of such predictions is that, unlike under EU
theory, when evaluating lotteries, the weights
need not sum to one.12
Quiggin (1982) proposed a rankdependent model to solve this problem.
Under the rank-dependent approach, when
evaluating a lottery X
 ≡ (x 1, μ  1; x 2, μ  2; … ,
x N  , μ  N), a person first ranks the outcomes
from best to worst. Specifically, if the outcomes are ordered such that x 1  < x 2  < ⋯
  is
< x N, then the weight on outcome n
for n = 1
⎧π( μ1)
⎪
n
n−1
π


∑


μ




−
π

∑




μ




for
n ∈ { 2,…,
N − 1}, 
ωn= ⎨
    
   
 ( j=1 j) ( j=1 j)

⎪
 n−1

for n = N
⎩1 − π( ∑
j=1μj)

3.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
Rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU)
theory emerged from a tradition in psychology of relaxing the feature of EU theory that
outcomes are weighted by their p
 robabilities.

12 For instance, if π(1 / 3)   > 1 / 3, then there exists  y   > 0
̅
such that the model predicts a person would choose the
lottery (x, 1 /3; x − y, 1 / 3; x − 2y, 1 / 3)over the lottery
(x, 1)for all y ∈ (0,  y ̅).
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where πis a probability weighting function.
With this approach, when evaluating a lottery, the weights sum to one by construction,
and there are no violations of stochastic
dominance.13
The implications of RDEU theory, of
course, depend on the specific probability
weighting function that is used. The literature—in large part based on experimental
results—has emphasized an inverse-Sshaped probability weighting function: for
small μ, π(μ)is concave and has π(μ)   > μ,
while for large μ, π(μ)is convex and has
π(μ)   < μ.
Beyond the general inverse-S shape, a
number of parameterized functional forms
have been proposed in the literature on
probability weighting. Some prominent functional forms are reported in panel B of table
1,14 and depicted in figure 2.15 Note two features of these functions. First, except for the
Karmarkar function, they are not symmetric
around 
μ = 1 / 2
, but rather they typically
cross the forty-five-degree line at μ
 < 1/ 2.
Second, the functions exhibit excess steepness near μ = 0and μ
 = 1—in the sense of
π′(μ)   >> 1. In fact, in their original discussion of probability weighting, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) instead suggested that
probability weighting is discontinuous at
13 While some view rank dependence as merely a technicial solution, others attempt to offer intuitive arguments
for rank dependence (e.g., Diecidue and Wakker 2001).
14 To be precise, Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992)
propose the functional form
π(μ    | μ 
i

−i)

δ μ  γ  
δ μ  i    + ∑ j≠i  μ  j  

i
=  __________
   ,
γ
γ

i = 1, … , N,

with μ  −idenoting the entries of the probability vector μ

other than μ 
 i  . For N = 2,the above expression coincides
with what appears in table 1, and that functional form
(used also in the case of N
 > 2) is commonly referred to in
the literature as the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte function.
15 Figure 2 closely parallels figure 1 from Prelec (1998).
As in that figure, we use α
 = 0.65for the Prelec function
and γ = 0.61for the Tversky and Kahnemann function. For
the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte function, we use δ = 0.77
and γ = 0.44, which are estimates from Gonzalez and Wu
(1999). For the Karmarkar function, we use γ = 0.50.
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the endpoints, reflecting a notion that as the
probability of an event gets small enough,
people ignore that possible event. The subsequent literature seems to have introduced
the excess steepness near μ
 = 0and μ
 = 1
to eliminate this discontinuity. However, it
is unclear how much evidence there is for
this excess steepness. As we shall see, in
field applications, it is important to assess
whether and how low-probability events
are incorporated into a person’s decision
calculations.
3.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory has two key features: probability weighting and loss aversion. As discussed
above, probability weighting derived from
an older tradition in psychology, and is fully
incorporated into RDEU theory. Loss aversion represents a second departure from
the EU model: instead of a utility function
udefined over final wealth, there is a value
function v defined over gains and losses relative to some reference point.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose
an improved version of their theory, labeled
“cumulative prospect theory” (CPT). CPT
requires as an input a reference outcome s,
and each outcome is coded as a gain or
loss relative to this reference outcome.16
Consider a lottery 
X ≡ (x 1, μ  1; … ; x N, μ  N)
and a reference point s, and suppose
x 1  < ⋯ < x n̅ −1  ≤ s < x n̅   < ⋯ < x N. Under
CPT, this lottery is evaluated as
N

	
V(X; r)   ≡   ∑  ω  n  v( x n  − s) ,
n=1

16 The discussion will focus on a reference outcome
expressed in increments to wealth, and thus the comparison is xto s. One could equivalently use a reference
outcome expressed in final wealth, in which case the comparison would be (w + x)to s—i.e., the value function
v(x − s)would be replaced with v((w + x)  − s).
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where the weight on outcome x  n is
−
for n = 1
⎧π  ( μ   1)
⎪π   −(∑ nj=1μ  j)− π  −(∑ n−1
for n ∈ { 2, ...,   n − 1}
j=1 μ  j)
̅
ω  n  =  ⎨
      
    
   

.
 + N
+
N

π
  (∑



μ
 



−

π
 


∑


μ
 



 
n

,
...,
N
− 1}
for
n
∈
{
j=n j)
( j=n+1 j)
̅
⎪
⎩π   +( μ   N)
for n = N

In this formulation, π 
 − and π  + are probability weighting functions applied to the
loss and gain events, respectively. Thus, the

theory permits differential weighting for
gains and losses.17
The value function vis assumed to have
three key properties: (i) v(0)   = 0and it
assigns positive value to gains and negative
value to losses; (ii) it is concave over gains
and convex over losses (often labeled “diminishing sensitivity”); and (iii) it is steeper in
17 If π  +  (μ)   = 1 − π  −  (1 − μ)
, then the distinction
between π  − and π  + becomes irrelevant.
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the loss domain than in the gain domain
(often labeled “loss aversion”).
To estimate a CPT model, one often needs
functional form assumptions (although occasionally researchers have attempted more
nonparametric approaches). In terms of
the probability weighting functions π 
 − and
+
π  , the CPT literature has used the same
functional forms as the RDEU literature—
indeed, the Tversky and Kahneman function
reported in panel B of table 1 was suggested
as part of CPT. The value function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is
reported in panel C of table 1. In that specification, α
 ∈ (0, 1)and β ∈ (0, 1) generate
diminishing sensitivity in the gain and loss
domains, respectively. The parameter λ
 > 1
reflects loss aversion, as it implies the negative value generated by a loss is greater than
the positive value generated by an equally
sized gain. Based on their experimental data,
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggest that
λ = 2.25, α = β = 0.88, and for their probability weighting function, γ 
−  = 0.69 and
+
γ    = 0.61.
When applying CPT, researchers must
specify a reference point, and typically this
is done using some external intuitive argument. For instance, in experiments it is typically argued that the reference point should
be zero or experimentally endowed wealth.
In field settings, researchers often argue for
a natural reference point given the setting
(e.g., in his recent analysis of tax evasion,
Rees-Jones 2018 argues that a zero balance due is a natural reference point). This
extra “degree of freedom” in CPT is often
seen as a limitation and it has led to various
ideas about how to tie down the reference
point.
3.4 Expectations-Based Models
A class of “expectations-based” models
advances the idea that expectations about
outcomes set reference points and influence
choices.
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Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) propose a
model of loss aversion in which the reference
point is taken to be one’s expectations about
outcomes. Moreover, because such expectations could involve uncertainty about future
outcomes, they extend the model of loss
aversion to use a reference lottery instead of
a reference outcome.
Specifically, under Kőszegi–Rabin (KR)
loss aversion, the utility from choosing lot given a reference lottery
tery X ≡ ( x n  , μ  n)  N
n=1
 

is
X̃   ≡ ( x̃   m  , μ̃   m)  M
m=1
N

M

V(X|X̃ ) ≡   ∑    ∑  μ  n μ̃   m
n=1 m=1

× [u(w + x n) + v(w + x n  |w + x̃   m)].
The function urepresents standard “intrinsic” utility defined over final wealth, just as
in EU. The function vrepresents “gain–loss”
utility that results from experiencing gains or
losses relative to the reference lottery. Gain–
loss utility depends on how a realized outcome x nis compared to all possible outcomes
that could have occurred in the reference
lottery. For the value function, KR use
η[u(y) − u(y ̃ )] if u(y) > u(y ̃ )
   
. 

v(y|ỹ ) =     
{ηλ[u(y)  − u(ỹ )] if u(y)   ≤ u(ỹ )
In this formulation, the magnitude of gain–
loss utility is determined by the intrinsic
utility gain or loss relative to consuming the
reference point. Moreover, gain–loss utility
takes a two-part linear form, where η ≥ 0
captures the importance of gain–loss utility
relative to intrinsic utility and λ ≥ 1 captures
loss aversion. The model reduces to EU
when η = 0or λ = 1.
KR propose that the reference lottery
equals recent expectations about outcomes—i.e., if a person expects to face
lottery X̃ , then her reference lottery becomes
X̃ . However, because situations vary in terms
of when a person deliberates about and then
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commits to her choices, KR offer multiple
solution concepts for the determination of
the reference lottery. Here, we focus on two
solution concepts that are perhaps most relevant for field data.
DEFINITION 2 (KR–PPE): Given a choice
set X, a lottery X ∈ Xis a personal equilibrium if for all X′ ∈ X, V(X | X)   ≥ V(X′|X), and
it is a preferred personal equilibrium if there
does not exist another X
 ′ ∈ Xsuch that X′is a
personal equilibrium and V(X′|X′) > V(X | X).
DEFINITION 3 (KR–CPE): Given a
choice set X, a lottery X
 ∈ Xis a choiceacclimating personal equilibrium if for all
X′ ∈ X, V(X | X)   ≥ V(X′|X′).
KR suggest that PPE is appropriate
when, faced with a choice set X, a person
thinks about the choice situation, decides
on a planned choice X
 ∈ X, and then makes
that choice shortly before the uncertainty is
resolved. An option X
 is a personal equilibrium if, when a person plans on that option
and thus that option determines her reference lottery, it is indeed optimal to make that
choice. Among the set of personal equilibria, the PPE is the personal equilibrium that
yields the highest “utility.” In terms of field
contexts, then, PPE is an appropriate solution concept when a person is able to think
about a choice situation for some duration
and then make a choice shortly before the
uncertainty is resolved. Among those that we
discuss in sections 5 and 6, the field context
that perhaps best fits this scenario is betting
on horse races.
The idea behind CPE is that, when faced
with a choice set X, a person commits to a
choice well in advance of the resolution of
uncertainty. By the time the uncertainty is
resolved, the person will have become accustomed to her choice and hence expect the
lottery induced by her choice. Hence, the
person chooses the lottery that yields the

largest utility conditional on that lottery being
the reference lottery. Two field contexts in
which a person commits to a choice well in
advance of the resolution of uncertainty are
property insurance and health insurance.
When estimating the KR model, one
needs to estimate the parameters ηand λ
along with the utility function u
 (y). Because
the latter is meant to be standard utility over
final wealth, as in EU, any of the functional
forms for u(y)in table 1 might be used.
Models of “disappointment aversion” also
assume that choices are influenced by expectations. The concept of disappointment aversion was proposed by Bell (1985) and further
developed by Loomes and Sugden (1986) and
Gul (1991). The basic idea is that one is disappointed (or elated) if the realized outcome
of a lottery is worse (or better) than expected.
Bell (1985) proposes a variant of disappointment aversion in which disappointment
is determined from a comparison of one’s
realized utility to one’s EU, and the person
accounts for expected disappointment when
making a choice. Formally, a lottery 
X ≡ 
 

is
evaluated
as
( x n  , μ  n)  N
n=1
N

V(X)   = ∑ μ  nu(w + x n)
n=1

N

− β ∑ μ  n[I(u(w + x n) < U̅ )(U̅ − u(w + x n))],
n=1

where 
Iis an indicator function and
U̅   ≡ ∑ N
n=1 μ  n  u(w + x n). The first term is the
standard EU of lottery X. The second term
reflects the expected disutility from disappointment that arises when the realized utility from an outcome is less than the standard
EU of the lottery. The parameter β
 captures
the magnitude of disappointment aversion,
where the model reduces to EUfor β = 0.18
18 Bell (1985) further assumes that (i) u(x)   = x, and (ii)
a person might also experience utility from elation when
the realized outcome is larger than the expected utility. Even with the latter, however, his model reduces to
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Gul (1991) proposes another variant of
disappointment aversion in which disappointment is determined from a comparison
of one’s realized outcome to one’s certainty
equivalent for the lottery. Formally, a lottery
_
 

is
evaluated
as
V

(X)  
= 
V
X ≡ ( x n  , μ  n)  N
n=1
such that
_

N

V
 = ∑ μ  nu(w + x n)
n=1
N

_ _

− β ∑ μ  n[I(u(w + x n) < V)(V
 − u(w + x n))].
n=1

_
The zthat solves u(w + z)   = Vis one’s certainty equivalent for lottery Xin this model.
When Bell disappointment aversion is
applied to binary lotteries, the model is
equivalent to the KR–CPE model. Gul disappointment aversion yields a slightly different model, though the structure is still quite
similar. (For equations in the binary insurance case, see section 4.4.) For lotteries with
more than two outcomes, the three models
are more distinct. For details, see the online
appendix.
When estimating models of disappointment aversion, one needs to estimate the
parameter β
 along with the utility function
u(y). Because the latter is standard utility
over final wealth, as in EU, any of the functional forms for u
 (y)in table 1 might be used.
4.

Model Predictions and Identification

Our goal in this section is to develop intuition for the types of data that may yield
point identification of a model’s parameters.
Point identification obtains when, given any
two distinct values for the parameter vector
the model in the text where β
 represents the difference
between the marginal disutility from disappointment and
the marginal utility from elation. Loomes and Sugden
(1986) also use this formulation, except they study nonlinear disappointment.
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characterizing the model, one has that the
model (when applied with each of these
parameter vectors) yields a different predicted distribution for the observable data.19
The subsections below discuss, for each of
the models presented in the prior section,
the conditions under which the model’s
parameters are point identified.
To facilitate our discussion, we focus
throughout this section on the example of households purchasing insurance.
Specifically, we consider the situation in
which a household incurs a loss L
 with probability μ, but also has the option to purchase
insurance against this loss with a deductible
d ≥ 0. The willingness to pay zfor such an
insurance policy must satisfy the indifference condition
(w − z, 1 − μ; w − z − d, μ)  
   
     ∼ (w, 1 − μ; w − L, μ) .

Table 2 reports, for each of the models presented in the previous section, the equation
implied by this indifference condition—i.e.,
the equation one would solve to obtain a
value for z.
In the empirical applications discussed in
this review, typically the observable data are
comprised of (i) a discrete choice set (e.g., a
set of insurance products); (ii) the characteristics of that choice set (e.g., the premiums
associated with each insurance product);
and (iii) the option selected from that choice
set.20 The willingness to pay z for an insurance product is a useful tool in generating,
for such discrete choice sets, the model-implied joint distribution of premiums and optimal choices. Consider, for instance, when
the choice set is composed of two options,
19 See Lewbel (2017) for a thorough discussion of identification in econometrics.
20 In some cases, the data also contain some characteristics of the household making the choice

516

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (June 2018)
TABLE 2

Willingness to Pay (z) for Insurance with Deductible d,
against the Possibility of Losing L
 with Probability μ
Model

WTP
μ   u(w − d − z)  + (1 − μ) u(w − z)

=

μ   u(w − L)  + (1 − μ) u(w)

π(μ) u(w − d − z)  + (1 − π(μ)) u(w − z)

=

π(μ) u(w − L)  + (1 − π(μ)) u(w)

π  −  (μ) v(−d − z)  + (1 − π  −  (μ)) v(−z)

=

π  −  (μ) v(−L)

KR-CPE

{ μ[1 + Λ(1 − μ)]  u(w − d − z)
+ [ 1 − μ[1 + Λ(1 − μ)]]  u(w − z)}

=

{ μ[1 + Λ(1 − μ)]  u(w − L)
+ [1 − μ[1 + Λ(1 − μ)]]  u(w)}

Bell–DA

{μ[1 + β(1 − μ)]  u(w − d − z)
+ [ 1 − μ[1 + β(1 − μ)]]  u(w − z)}

=

 μ[1 + β(1 − μ)]  u(w − L)
{
+ [1 − μ[1 + β(1 − μ)]]  u(w)}

Gul–DA

_____   u(w − d − z)
    
{ 

=

{_____
 
   u(w − L)

EU
RDEU
CPT

(1 + β) μ
1 + βμ

}

+ (
 1 −  _____ )  u(w − z) 
(1 + β) μ
1 + βμ

(1 + β) μ
1 + βμ

}

   
+ (1 −  _____ )  u(w) 
(1 + β) μ
1 + βμ

Note: In KR–CPE, Λ ≡ η(λ − 1).

the option to purchase a particular insurance
product and the option to remain uninsured.
If zis the willingness to pay for the insurance
product, then the model-implied joint distribution of premiums and optimal choices
involves choosing the insurance for all premiums less than z and choosing no insurance
for all premiums greater than z.
To simplify the exposition (and notation),
our discussion of identification assumes having data on a population who share the same
wealth w
 , potential loss L, and loss probability μ. Insurance products are defined by
their deductible d—
 i.e., a choice set will be
a set of available deductibles (and possibly
also the option not to insure). The data will
include, for each household, a premium associated with each available deductible, along
with the household’s choice. For such data,
it is natural to use z(d)to denote the willingness to pay for insurance with deductible
d, supressing the fact that this willingness to

pay also depends on w, L, and μ. Of course,
in practice, there is heterogeneity in w, L,
and μ(and other household characteristics).
If these variables were observable, then all
identification arguments below would hold
conditional on these observables—indeed,
as we’ll see the literature often views μ as
an observed variable. If these variables are
unobserved, then identification can become
somewhat more complicated—in this and
subsequent sections, we discuss ways to
deal with various forms of unobserved
heterogeneity.
4.1 Expected Utility
We first consider point identification under
EU. From table 2, under EU z(d) satisfies
u(w − z(d)  − d)  − u(w − L)
u(w)  − u(w − z(d))

1−μ

  
  
   =  ___
	 ________________
μ   .
When estimating risk preferences, much
of the literature assumes a parametric
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functional form for u
 —e.g., CARA, CRRA,
or NTD—with a single parameter capturing
the magnitude of risk aversion. These functional forms all fall in a class of utility functions that satisfy assumption 1 below.
Denote by u
 (y; ϕ)the parametric utility
function, where yis a final wealth state and ϕ
is a taste parameter. Assume that uis continuous in both y > 0and ϕ ∈ ℝ, and that ϕ = 0
if and only if u(y; ϕ)   = y. In addition, maintain the following.
ASSUMPTION 1: (i) u(y; ϕ)is increasing in y
, and for any y 
0  > y 1  > y 2, the
ratio R ≡ [u(y 1; ϕ) − u(y 2; ϕ)]/[u(y 0; ϕ) −
. (ii)
u( y 1; ϕ)]is strictly increasing in ϕ

21

R
=
∞
and
l

im 
  

R
=
0
.
lim ϕ  
→∞
ϕ→−∞

Assumption 1 naturally associates ϕ

with the magnitude of an individual’s risk
aversion.22 In particular, assumption 1
holds if and only if for any y 0  > y 1  > y 2
and 
μ ∈ (0, 1)
, there exists a ϕ
̅  such that
( y 0 , 1 − μ; y 2 , μ)   ≻ ( y 1 , 1) for ϕ ∈ [0, ϕ̅ ),
( y 0 , 1 − μ; y 2 , μ)   ∼ ( y 1 , 1) for ϕ = ϕ̅ , and
( y 0  , 1 − μ; y 2  , μ)   ≺ ( y 1  , 1) for ϕ > ϕ̅ . In
words, whenever a person compares a binary
risky lottery to a certain amount in the interval ( y 0  , y 2), the person chooses the riskier
lottery if her risk aversion ϕ
 is small enough,
and she chooses the certain amount if her
risk aversion ϕ
 is high enough.
Consider the willingness to pay z ( d0  ) for
one specific deductible d 0. Under EU, for
any u
(y; ⋅ )satisfying assumption 1, each
preference parameter 
ϕimplies a unique
z( d0  ), where the larger is ϕ(the more risk
21 The

limit assumption is made merely to guarantee
interior solutions in any formal results below. In practice,
this assumption is unlikely to be important. NTD does not
satisfy this assumption, but result 1, below, holds for NTD
as well.
22 Assumption 1 is equivalent to condition (e) in Pratt
(1964 theorem 1). As shown there, it is equivalent to
assuming that an increase in ϕcorresponds to an increase
in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
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averse the household is) the larger is z( d0  )
(the more the household is willing to pay
for insurance). It follows that a data set in
which all households make a choice between
the same two options—insurance with
deductible d0  versus no insurance—can be
sufficient for point identification of ϕ
. In
particular, because each ϕimplies a unique
z( d0  ), each ϕalso implies a unique joint distribution of premiums and optimal choices, and
thus there is point identification as long as the
data contain sufficient variation in premiums.
The literature most often assumes a parametric functional form for u, not only when
estimating EU but also when estimating the
alternative models we discuss below. As we
have seen, this assumption dramatically simplifies identification, but it is a strong restriction. It would be desirable to be able to trace
out the utility function nonparametrically
over the relevant support. Doing so can be
straightforward if one is willing to assume
homogeneous preferences (and has access to
data exhibiting the type of variation described
above). In practice, however, there is heterogeneity across households, and allowing for
this heterogeneity dramatically complicates
relaxing the parametric assumption on u. We
return to this issue in section 6.2.1.
4.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
We next consider point identification
under RDEU. From table 2, under RDEU
z(d) satisfies
u(w − z(d)  − d)  − u(w − L)
u(w)  − u(w − z(d))

1 −  
π
  
  
   =  ___
	 ________________
π ,

where we use πin place of π(μ)given our
maintained assumption that all households
have the same μ.23
23 In other words, the relationship between π
 and μ
plays no role in the discussion in this section. Hence, the
identification results in this section also hold in an EU
model when one attempts to estimate both risk aversion
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In this case, model predictions depend on
both the utility function u
 and the decision
weight π
 , which complicates identification
even when the utility function is parametrically specified as u(y; ϕ). As above, consider
the willingness to pay z ( d0  ) for one specific
deductible d0  . Unlike above, it is not the case
that each vector of preference parameters
(ϕ, π)implies a unique z( d0  ). Rather, there
is a set of (ϕ, π)pairs consistent with z ( d0  ).
To illustrate, we define π
  ̅ (ϕ | d,   z ̅)to be the
required π
 as a function of ϕ
 that generates
willingness to pay z(d)   =  z 
̅. We can rearrange the equality above to derive
π  ̅(ϕ | d,   z  ̅) =

u(w; ϕ)  − u(w −   z  ; ϕ)

__________________________________
̅
   
      
  .
u(w; ϕ)  − u(w −   z  ; ϕ) +  u(w −   z   − d; ϕ)  − u(w − L; ϕ) 

[

̅

]

[

̅

]

deductible d1    > d0  . The willingness to pay
z( d1  )is consistent with another set of (ϕ, π)
pairs represented by the curve π ̅ (ϕ | d1    , z( d1  )),
again as depicted in figure 3. As we establish
in result 1 below, these two curves cross at
only one point, yielding a unique (ϕ, π) pair
consistent with both z ( d0  ) and z( d1  ).
RESULT 1: If u(y; ϕ)satisfies assumption 1, then for any 0 < d 0  < d 1  ≤ L there
exists a unique ϕ
 ̅  such that (i) π ̅ (ϕ| d0    , z( d0  ))  
= π ̅ (ϕ| d1  , z(d1  )) and (ii) π ̅ (ϕ| d0  , z(d0  )) <
ϕ < ϕ̅ , and π ̅ (ϕ| d0    ,
 π ̅ (ϕ| d1  ,z(d1  ))for all 
z(d0  ))   > π ̅ (ϕ| d1    , z( d1  ))for all ϕ > ϕ̅ .
PROOF:
First, note that because 
uis increasing in y, z( d0  ) > z( d1  ) while z( d0  ) + d0    <
z( d1  ) + d1  (otherwise the household would
violate dominance). Define A
 (ϕ) ≡ u(w; ϕ) −
u(w  −  z(d0  ); ϕ), B(ϕ) ≡ u(w − z(d0  ) − d0  ; ϕ)
−  u(w − L; ϕ),
A′ (ϕ) ≡ u(w; ϕ) − u(w  −
z(d1  ); ϕ), and B′ (ϕ) ≡ u(w − z(d1  ) − d1  ; ϕ) −
u(w − L; ϕ)
, in which case 
π ̅ (ϕ| d0    , z( d0  ))  
= A(ϕ)/[A(ϕ)  + B(ϕ)] and π ̅ (ϕ| d1    , z( d1  ))  
= A′ (ϕ)/[A′ (ϕ)  + B′ (ϕ)]. Hence

Given this function, any preference–parameter pair ( ϕ, π ̅ (ϕ | d0    , z( d0  ))) is consistent with
z( d0  ). For any uthat satisfies assumption 1,
π ̅ (ϕ | d0    , z( d0  ))is decreasing in ϕ, as depicted
in figure 3. Intuitively, both an increased risk
aversion and an increased decision weight
on the loss state imply an increased willingness to pay for insurance. Hence, for a fixed
willingness to pay, as risk aversion increases,
π ̅(ϕ| d0 , z( d0 )) ≷ π ̅(ϕ| d1    , z( d1  ))
the decision weight on the loss state must

decline in order to keep the willingness to
A(ϕ)
A′ (ϕ)
    ⇔  ________
 
  ≷ ________
 
 
pay unchanged.
A(ϕ)  + B(ϕ)
′
A  (ϕ)  + B′ (ϕ)

      
 


Hence, unlike for EU, under RDEU one
B′ (ϕ)
A′ (ϕ)
____
____

               ⇔  
 
 
≷
 
 
.
cannot point identify the vector of preferB(ϕ)
A(ϕ)
ence parameters (ϕ, π)using a data set in
After algebraic manipulations, assumption 1
which all households make a choice between
yields that A′ (ϕ)/A(ϕ)is a strictly decreasing
the same two options. However, it can sufA′ (ϕ)
____
  = 0 and
function of ϕ
 , where lim  ϕ   
fice to observe households choosing between
→∞
A(ϕ)
A′ (ϕ)

three options. For example, consider house____
lim     
   = 1. Analogously, assumption 1
ϕ→−∞
A(ϕ)
holds choosing between no insurance, insuryields that B′ (ϕ)/B(ϕ)is a strictly increasing
ance with deductible d 0, and insurance with
B′ (ϕ)
function of ϕ
 , where lim  ϕ→∞  ____   = 1 and
ϕand unobserved subjective beliefs (or unobserved risk
types), where π
 would be those subjective beliefs (or risk
types). If instead one observes μ
 and wants to identify the
function π
 ( ⋅ )over some range of values for μ
 , one needs
data as described in the text for all those values of μ
 .

 ′ (ϕ)
B
B(ϕ)

B(ϕ)

____   = 0. The result follows. ∎
lim     
ϕ→−∞

The key intuition behind result 1 is that
probability distortions in isolation yield, for
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π

z(d1)
L − d1

z(d0)
L − d0
π(ϕ|d0, z(d0))
π(ϕ|d1, z(d1))
ϕ
Figure 3. Identification in the RDEU Model

instance, that the willingness to pay for full
insurance is exactly double the willingness to
pay to eliminate half the risk (in our example, for d
 = L / 2). On the other hand, for
standard risk aversion (ϕ), the concern for
reducing risk is stronger the more risk one
bears, and so the willingness to pay for full
insurance is less than double the willingness
to pay to eliminate half the risk. Moreover,
the larger one’s standard risk aversion is, the
stronger this asymmetry will be. Hence, the
ratio of the willingness to pay to reduce some
of the risk relative to the willingness to pay
to reduce more of the risk serves to identify
how much standard risk aversion is present
relative to how much distortion of probabilities is at play. This intuition can be applied in
other contexts, as well.
Result 1 shows that a pair {z( d0  ), z( d1  )}
determines a unique pair (ϕ, π).24 Conversely,
24 Note that, for some values of {z( d  ), z( d  )}, the
0
1
unique (ϕ, π)could have ϕ
 < 0(in which case preferences
are risk loving).

a pair (ϕ, π)determines a unique pair
{ z( d0  ), z( d1  )}and also a unique choice correspondence C
( p 0  , p 1) that captures the
choice from the set { d0    , d1    } given premiums
{ p 0  , p 1  }. In turn, { z( d0  ), z( d1  )} and C( p 0  , p 1)
determine a unique joint distribution of premiums and optimal choices, and thus there is
point identification as long as the data contain
sufficient variation in premiums. It follows
that a data set in which all households make
a choice between the same three options—
insurance with deductible d 
 0, insurance with
, and no insurance—can be
deductible d1  
sufficient for point identification of the preference parameters (ϕ, π), provided there is
sufficient variation in premiums.
4.3 EU and RDEU with Unobserved
Heterogeneity
The discussion above focuses on identification of the EU or RDEU preference
parameters for a population in which everyone has the same preference parameters
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(i.e., for a model with homogeneous preferences or a model in which preferences
depend on only observable characteristics).
It is often important to permit unobserved
heterogeneity in preference parameters (as
we discuss more in section 5.1.2). How can
one point identify the distribution of risk
preferences in this case?
Intuitively, the researcher now needs to
observe how the population (or at least a
large enough representative subsample)
allocates itself across the different options
within a fixed menu, and moreover the
researcher needs to observe this allocation for a sufficiently large set of different
fixed menus. For the insurance context
that we have been using in this section, this
means that the researcher needs to observe
data that identify the multinomial distribution of chosen deductibles conditional
on premiums, with sufficient variation in
premiums (i.e., variation in the choice
menu) to identify the distribution of risk
preferences.
To illustrate, consider an EU model in the
insurance context with a parametric utility
function u
 (y; ϕ)that satisfies assumption 1.
Suppose that the choice set consists of three
    > dC  , with
deductible options, d 

A  > dB
respective premiums p 
A  < p B  < p C. Each
p ≡ ( p A  , p B  , p C)is a choice menu. One can
show that a choice menu p
 partitions the support of ϕin three regions—(−∞, ϕ  AB  (p));
( ϕ  AB  (p), ϕ  BC  (p)); and ( ϕ  BC  (p),   ∞)—so
that, when facing 
p
, individuals with 
ϕ < 
A  , individuals
ϕ  AB  (p)choose deductible d 
with ϕ ∈ ( ϕ  AB  (p) , ϕ  BC  (p) )choose deduct, and individuals with ϕ
 > ϕ  BC  (p)
ible dB  
F
choose deductible 
d C.25 If we then let 
denote the cumulative distribution function
of ϕ, for a given p
 the model predicts that
25 Of course, for some p, some of these intervals might
be empty (which occurs when pis such that an option is
dominated). While the intuition extends in a straightforward way, for simplicity we ignore such p here.

a fraction F( ϕ  AB  (p))chooses deductible d A,
a fraction F
 ( ϕ  BC  (p))  − F( ϕ  AB  (p)) chooses
deductible dB  , and a fraction 1 − F( ϕ  BC  (p))
chooses deductible d C. The researcher then
matches these predictions to the empirical
multinomial distribution of chosen deductibles conditional on premiums p
 , and thereby
identifies the value of Fat two points. By
repeating this exercise for a large number of
choice menus, Fcan be fully learned from the
data. In particular, we need variation in p
  that
yields variation in ( ϕ  AB  (p), ϕ  BC  (p))that spans
the entire support of ϕ,so that the entire distribution Fcan be identified. We return to
discussing this strategy in section 6.2.2.
If instead we consider an RDEU model,
there are potentially two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: in standard risk
aversion 
ϕand in the decision weight π
 .
In principle, a similar approach to what
was delineated for the EU model might be
applied, building on the insight in figure 3.
Suppose that the choice set consists of two
deductible options, d 
 A  > dB  , with respective
premiums p A  < p B, and also the option of no
insurance. Each ( p A  , p B)is a choice menu.
Given p A, the curve π ̅ (ϕ| dA    , p A) partitions
the (ϕ, π)space into a region that prefers
d Ato no insurance and a region that prefers no insurance to d A. Given p B, the curve
π ̅ (ϕ| dB    , p B) yields an analogous partition for
d Bversus no insurance. Finally, given the pair
( p A  , p B), one can add a third curve that partitions the (ϕ, π)space into a region that prefers dA   to dB  and a region that prefers d B to
d A. These three partitions can then be combined to generate, as a function of ( p A  , p B),
an overall partition of the ( ϕ, π)space into a
region that chooses d A, a region that chooses
d B, and a region that chooses no insurance.26
As above, the researcher can then match these
predictions to the empirical 
multinomial
26 As above, for some ( p    , p  ), some of these regions
A
B
might be empty (which occurs when ( p A  , p B) is such that
an option is dominated).
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istribution of chosen deductibles condid
tional on premiums ( p A  , p B), and thereby
obtain some information about the distribution of ( ϕ, π). By repeating this exercise for a
sufficiently large set of choice menus, the distribution can be learned from the data.
Nonetheless, to date, point identification
of multidimensional heterogeneity in risk
preferences has relied mostly upon parametric assumptions about their joint distribution.
An interesting departure from this literature
appears in Ericson et al. (2018), who build
upon and expand the arguments here to provide results on nonparametric identification
of unobserved heterogeneity in both risk
aversion and risk, where “risk” can be interpreted as subjective beliefs. Their analysis
can be related to ours observing that π
 , as
described in this section, can be interpreted
as risk and can be learned without connecting
it with claim probabilities μ
 ; observation of μ
and variation in μare only needed to identify
πas a function of μ(see footnote 23).

4.4 Distinguishing More Complex Models

Finally, we discuss identification of more
complex models that include additional
sources of aversion to risk—e.g., KR loss
aversion or disappointment aversion (DA)—
and perhaps multiple sources at the same
time. We organize our discussion in two
parts. First, we consider contexts in which
households only make choices over binary
lotteries. Then we consider contexts in which
households make choices over lotteries with
more than two outcomes.
If the data contains only choices over
binary lotteries X
 ≡ ( x 1, μ; x 2, 1 − μ) , with
x 1  < x 2 ,then all models considered in section 3 (except for CPT and KR–PPE) can be
reduced to one in which a household chooses
the lottery that maximizes
(5)  
U(X)   = Ω(μ) u(w + x 1)
+ (1 − Ω(μ)) u(w + x 2), 
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where Ω(μ)is a probability distortion function, as in Barseghyan et al. (2013b). In the
online appendix, we show that the function
Ω(μ)may take one of the following forms:
Under RDEU:
Ω(μ) = π(μ);
Under KR–CPE: Ω(μ) = μ(1 + Λ(1 − μ));

   
    
    
       

Under Bell–DA: Ω(μ) = μ(1 + β(1 − μ));
Under Gul–DA



Ω(μ) = (1 + β)μ/(1 + βμ).27

Hence, even if one has data that allows for
nonparametric point identification of Ω
 (μ),
the underlying models can be distinguished
only to the extent that they impose different
restrictions on Ω
 (μ). Clearly, KR–CPE and
Bell–DA cannot be distinguished from each
other. Each of KR–CPE/Bell–DA and Gul–
DA impose strong parametric assumptions,
and so does RDEU if a parametric functional
form is assumed for π(μ)(e.g., any of those
in table 1). With these parametric assumptions, the models can be tested to find which
best fits the data. However, a more flexible
approach would allow for nonparametric
probability weighting. If either loss aversion
or disappointment aversion are also permitted, identification of the resulting Ω
 (μ)
function would not allow one to disentangle
these sources of aversion to risk. For example, KR–CPE and RDEU together yield
Ω(μ)   = π(μ) (1 + Λ(1 − π(μ))),and similarly for RDEU together with Bell–DA or
Gul–DA, so that π(μ)and Λ(or β) cannot be
separately identified.
Hence, if the data contain only binary lotteries, without relying strongly on functional
form assumptions, the best one can do is
focus on identification and estimation of
Ω(μ).Potential exceptions are represented
by models that feature CPT or KR–PPE.
Under CPT, V(X; r)does not take the form in
27 As we show in the online Appendix, under KR–
CPE the parameters λ and η always appear in the lottery
evaluation as the product Λ ≡ η(λ − 1), and therefore
only this product can be identified.
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equation (5) because there is an exogenous reference point and utility varies with
whether outcomes are above or below that
reference point. Hence, one can potentially
separately identify the CPT component of
the model by studying how behavior changes
as outcomes move above and below the
reference point (or, alternatively, by studying how behavior changes as the reference
point changes). Under KR–PPE, one cannot
define a U(X)independently of the other
lotteries in the choice set. Hence, one can
potentially separately identify the KR–PPE
component of the model by studying how
behavior changes as the choice set varies.
Of course, one needs data with the right
type of variation to pursue either of these
approaches.
A frequent assumption in the literature
is that subjective beliefs μcoincide with
objective expectations (e.g., “objective”
claim probabilities), which in turn the
econometrician can estimate. However, this
assumption may fail in a given application.
In that case, when μis assumed to equal
objective expectations, the estimated Ω(μ)
function captures a mapping Ψ
 from the
estimated objective probabilities to subjective beliefs, thereby yielding another possible source of probability distortions. In
fact, as explained before, the relationship
between probability distortions and μ plays
no role in result 1, hence the same identification results hold for a model where Ω

is interpreted as subjective beliefs. In turn,
this implies that under the assumption that
households’ behavior is governed by RDEU,
for example, the estimated Ω
 (μ) function
would not necessarily correspond to π
 (μ),
but to (π ◦ Ψ) (μ), and in order to identify
the entire function (π ◦ Ψ) ( ⋅ )on a given
range of values for μ,one needs to learn
from the data the multinomial distribution
of deductibles chosen conditional on premiums and the probability of e xperiencing a
loss for the entire range of μof interest.

When data contain lotteries with more
than two outcomes, more refined inference
is possible. For example, as pointed out in
Barseghyan et al. (2013a), for lotteries with
more than two outcomes, a model with
RDEU only and a model with subjective
beliefs only, as formalized by the mapping Ψ,
generate different predictions. Intuitively,
under the mapping Ψ alone, the weight
on a particular event is independent of the
magnitude of the outcome associated with
that event. In contrast, under RDEU alone,
the magnitude of the outcome associated
with an event impacts the rank ordering of
outcomes, and thereby can influence the
weight. In addition, KR–CPE and RDEU
may generate predictions that are different
from those generated under either Bell–
DA or Gul–DA. Under either KR–CPE or
RDEU, the decision weight assigned to an
event depends only on the rank order of the
outcome associated with that event. In contrast, under either model of DA, the decision weight assigned to an event depends on
whether the outcome is above or below the
relevant benchmark that determines disappointment—i.e., the EU of the lottery under
Bell–DA, or the certainty equivalent under
Gul–DA. Hence, variation in outcomes that
does not change the rank order but does
change the magnitudes of intermediate
outcomes can be used to distinguish these
classes of models.
However, KR–CPE and RDEU cannot be
separately identified even with choice data
on lotteries with more than two outcomes.
Indeed, one can show that, for lotteries with
any number of outcomes, the combination of
KR–CPE and RDEU reduces to an equivalent RDEU model using effective probability
weighting Ω

(μ)   = π(μ) (1 + Λ(1 − π(μ))).
Hence, it is never possible to separately
identify KR–CPE and RDEU.28
28 Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) make a similar
point using a decision-theoretic approach.
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We conclude with two important and
related implications of this discussion.
First, for models that purport to estimate
an RDEU model, the estimated probability weighting functions might in fact reflect
a combination of probability weighting and
some other phenomenon—e.g., KR–CPE,
Bell–DA, or Gul–DA. Second, given this
fact, it would seem valuable to take a nonparametric approach to estimating RDEU
models, as opposed to restricting attention to the functional forms in table 1. As
we summarize in section 5.2, the more
recent literature has taken a first step in this
direction.
5.

Estimation with Individual-Level Data

In this section, we describe research
that estimates risk preferences using
individual-level data. We begin by discussing
the general approach that is broadly used in
all of these papers. We then review how that
approach has been applied in several different contexts: (i) property insurance, (ii) game
shows, and (iii) health insurance.
5.1 The General Approach
Estimating risk preferences from individual-level data typically requires three main
steps:
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Step 3: Enrich the basic models of risk
preferences with some form of heterogeneity, because in practice observationally
equivalent agents facing identical choice sets
are observed to make different choices.
The following subsections describe steps 2
and 3 in some detail, along with issues that
arise in each. It is within these steps that the
methodological toolkits of economics need
to be applied. Step 1 requires the researcher
to (i) identify field contexts that are likely
to best reveal risk preferences and (ii) be
able to obtain the corresponding data. The
existing work using individual-level data has
focused on some of the field contexts traditionally emphasized by the theoretical literature (e.g., insurance), for which researchers
have been able to obtain sufficiently rich data
sets. As more data sets become available, and
as economists develop a better understanding of how to approach estimation of risk
preferences, we expect the general approach
described in this section to be applied more
broadly.
5.1.1 Translation into Lotteries

Step 1: Identify a field context in which
economic agents make choices between
options that involve risk and for which the
researcher can obtain data on both the
agents’ choice sets and the agents’ choices.

Virtually any field-choice environment
involves a rich context and does not present
itself in the form of lotteries to which one
can immediately apply a model of risk preferences. Hence, to begin the analysis, one
needs to first make a series of assumptions
that permits translating the rich field context
into a choice between a well-defined set of
lotteries.

Step 2: Translate the (typically) rich
field-choice environment into a choice
between a well-defined set of lotteries (as
formalized in definition 1)—so that each
model of risk preferences defined in section 3 makes a prediction for which option
should be chosen as a function of the taste
parameters.

Consideration Sets.—To begin this translation, one needs to make an assumption
about what exactly is the set of options under
consideration—i.e., the consideration set.
In some cases, this appears straightforward.
For instance, in papers that study people’s
deductible choices for property insurance, a
natural assumption is that the consideration
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set includes each of the possible deductibles. Even here, however, the assumption
is less innocuous than it might seem—e.g.,
in some cases, there are available deductibles that are very rarely chosen, and so one
might wonder whether people are actually
even considering these possibilities, and one
might assume these deductibles are not part
of the choice set. Also, most analyses get
data from one company, and thus one cannot observe options that a household might
have considered purchasing from another
insurance company. We return in section
7.4 to discuss when assumptions on the consideration set are likely to be important and
when not.
Outcomes.—A closely related assumption
the researcher needs to make concerns the
set of possible outcomes that might occur. In
most field contexts, each option is associated
with many possible outcomes. Returning to
the example of deductible choices, during
the policy period an individual might incur
zero losses, one loss, two losses, three losses,
and so forth. However, the researcher often
restricts the set of possible outcomes. For
example, some analyses reviewed below in
the context of property insurance assume that
households focus only on the possibilities of
either zero or one loss, and they ignore the
(small-probability event) of multiple losses
during a single policy period. We return in
section 7.4 to discuss when assumptions on
the set of possible outcomes are likely to be
important and when not.
Subjective Beliefs.—A particularly important step in the translation from the field
context to a set of lotteries concerns what
one assumes about agents’ subjective beliefs
on the likelihood of the possible outcomes.
In some field contexts, there exist clear
objective probabilities for outcomes—e.g.,

in games of chance such as state-run lotteries or casino roulette. In most field contexts,

however, objective probabilities either do
not exist or are very hard to assess. For such
situations, an ideal approach would be to
simultaneously estimate both the agents’
beliefs and preferences. As we shall see in
section 7.3, however, this presents a fundamental identification problem. Hence, the
most common approach to date has been to
assume “rational expectations,” in the sense
that agents’ subjective beliefs correspond to
objective probabilities (often, but not always,
as reflected in past or future outcomes).
The researcher then either posits a carefully
thought-out model of rational expectations
formation, or posits a “reduced-form” model,
and estimates probabilities over outcomes
conditional on the chosen covariates based
on realized outcomes and observed covariates. These estimated probabilities are then
typically taken as “data,” in the sense that
they are treated as an observed input when
estimating preferences.29
Moral Hazard.—A final important
assumption concerns whether probabilities over outcomes depend on one’s choices—e.g., whether there is moral hazard in an
insurance context. In fact, most analyses that
estimate risk preferences assume there is no
moral hazard, although a few directly study
it. We discuss moral hazard more in section
5.1.3.
5.1.2 Sources of Unobserved Heterogeneity
Given a choice set X and beliefs μ
 , each
model of risk preferences from section 3
generates an objective function V
 (X, μ, θ)
such that the model predicts a person will
choose the option 
X ∈ X that maximizes
V( ⋅ ). The vector θ denotes a set of taste
parameters (which differs depending on the
model), and the goal is to estimate θ. When
29 In most cases, estimation error in this stage is not
accounted for when reporting standard errors for the estimates of preferences.
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one applies these models to individual-level
data, however, a problem inevitably arises:
whereas each model generically predicts
a unique optimal choice for any specific X,
μ, and θ, in virtually any data set observationally equivalent agents facing identical
choice sets are observed to make different
choices.30 Hence, one must enrich the basic
models of risk preferences by allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity. There are three
main approaches adopted in the literature
(and some analyses incorporate two or even
all three of them). We briefly review each of
these approaches below, and refer the reader
to Manski (1977) for an early discussion.
Traditionally, the most common approach
has been to use a classical random-utility model (McFadden 1974) wherein one
assumes that agents choose the option
X ∈ X that maximizes a “total utility”
W(X, μ, θ)   ≡ V(X, μ, θ)  + ε(X)
. Under this
approach, the unobserved heterogeneity
is specified at the level of utility assigned
to option X
 , and moreover, it is assumed to
be additively separable from the underlying
utility model reflected in V( ⋅ ). Hence, ε(X)
is an unobserved term that makes the agent
more or less likely to choose option X relative to what the agent’s underlying risk preference V
 (X, μ, θ)would predict. One then
specifies a joint distribution for the ε(X)s
for all X ∈ X, and the random-utility model
predicts a probability distribution over the
set of possible options. Typically, the ε(X)s
are assumed to be iid with a type 1 extreme
value distribution with scale parameter σ,31

30 Indeed, in experiments it is not uncommon for individual subjects to make different choices when presented
the same choice situation more than once.
31 The scale parameter σis a monotone transformation
of the variance of ε (X), and thus a larger σ
 means larger
variance. In general, one must either normalize the scale
of the utility function Vor the scale of the choice noise σ.
The literature typically uses parametrizations of Vthat normalize its scale, and thus σ
 is typically estimated.
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in which case the predicted probability of
choosing option X  ∗  ∈ X is
exp (V( X  ∗, μ, θ)/σ)

___________________
     .
	Pr    (X  ∗  | θ, σ)   =    


∑ X∈X   exp (V(X, μ, θ)/σ)



A second approach is to use a random-preference model wherein one assumes unobserved
heterogeneity in the vector θ of preference
parameters (recall that we discussed identification of such models in section 4.3). Under
this approach, one maintains that agents
choose the option 
X ∈ X that maximizes
V(X, μ, θ)
. However, one further assumes
that there is unobserved (to the researcher)
heterogeneity in θ , and thus the researcher
will observe different choices even among
observationally equivalent agents facing
identical choice sets. Of course, rather than
estimate a specific θ, the goal becomes to
estimate a distribution F
 (θ), which might be
done parametrically or nonparametrically. In
particular, if Θ( X  ∗)is the set of θ such that
X  ∗is the optimal choice, the predicted probability of choosing option X  ∗  ∈ X is
	Pr   ( 
 X  ∗  | F)   = ∫θ∈Θ(X  ∗)  dF(θ) .



Finally, one can assume unobserved heterogeneity in beliefs. Here, one again maintains that agents choose the option X ∈ X
that maximizes 
V(X, μ, θ)
. However, one
relaxes the assumption that subjective beliefs
μare “data,” and instead assumes that there
is unobserved (to the researcher) heterogeneity in beliefs. One then specifies a distribution for μ—
 typically with mean equal
to objective probabilities—and the model
predicts a probability distribution over the
set of possible outcomes. In particular, if
 ∗is the optiμ( X  ∗)is the set of μsuch that X 
mal choice, and if G(μ)is the distribution of
μ, then the predicted probability of choosing
X  ∗  ∈ X is
r  X  ∗  |θ, G)   = ∫μ∈μ(X  ∗)  dG(μ) .
P  ( 
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Once one enriches the model by incorporating one or more of these unobserved
heterogeneity terms, one then estimates the
parameters—both the preference parameters and the unobserved heterogeneity
parameters—by making the predicted distribution of choices “match” the empirically
observed distribution of choices (using maximum likelihood (ML), Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC), or some other econometric
technique).
Each of these approaches has advantages
and limitations. Incorporating unobserved
heterogeneity at the level of preference
parameters or beliefs can be appealing
because it maintains that choices are driven
entirely by the underlying utility model
reflected in V( ⋅ ). However, such models can
run into trouble when the choice set includes
dominated options—i.e., options that should
not be chosen for any values of θ or μ
 . If in
the data a dominated option is chosen with
positive probability (something that often
happens in practice), the researcher must
either introduce some form of random trembles in choice or dismiss the subpopulation
that chooses dominated options. For example, Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum
(2016), which we discuss in section 5.2, use a
random-preference model where the curvature of the utility function is constrained to lie
in a conservative range, and document that
the model is incompatible with the choice of
a dominated option made by 13 percent of
households in their data. In contrast, a random-utility model predicts that all options
in the choice set, even dominated options,
should be made with positive probability.
On the other hand, by imposing noise at
the utility level in an additively separable
way, random-utility models run into a different problem. In many underlying utility
models, the preference parameters influence not only the nature of preferences, but
also the utility differences between different
outcomes. As a simple example, under EU

with a CRRA utility function, an increase in
ρon the one hand makes a person more risk
averse, but also decreases the utility differences between any two outcomes. Because,
given additive separability, the unobserved
heterogeneity term operates on the utility
differences, this can generate some perverse
features. Apesteguia and Ballester (2018)
point out one particular implication of this
issue: For any fixed σ
 , the choice probabilities can be nonmonotonic in the preference
parameters. For instance, under EU with
CRRA (or CARA), increasing ρ(or r) might
initially shift choice probabilities more and
more toward favoring a safer lottery, but as
ρ(or r) gets larger yet the utility differences
shrink, and so choice probabilities shift more
and more toward choosing at random (and
away from favoring the safer lottery).
Of course, when one estimates a random-utility model, one jointly estimates the
preference parameters in θand the extent of
unobserved heterogeneity as reflected by σ
 ,
and part of the estimation will involve setting
the magnitude of σ
 to be appropriate relative
to the level of utility differences given the
estimated θ. For instance, under EU with
CRRA utility, when observed choices call for
the estimate of ρto be larger, the estimate
of σwill just need to be smaller. Hence, this
issue seems unlikely to be a major problem
when estimating a model of homogeneous
preferences. However, it becomes more
worrisome when estimating a model with
(observed or unobserved) heterogeneity
in risk preferences, because typically σ is
fixed across individuals and therefore individuals with different risk preferences are
differently impacted by the noise term in a
systematic way. Under EU with CRRA utility, for instance, those with higher ρwill be
more influenced by the noise term (i.e., their
choice probabilities will be more random).
We conclude with two final comments
about the three approaches above. First,
in principle, the unobserved h
 eterogeneity
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could reflect either permanent differences
across economic agents or random differences within agents across choice situations.
In cross-sectional data, one could never
distinguish one from the other, but if one
observes multiple choices from each agent,
one can start to tease these apart. In section 7.1, we discuss in detail the extent to
which economic agents exhibit stable risk
preferences versus risk preferences that
change from context to context. Second,
returning again to the comparison with the
experimental setting, we note that while the
latter permits great control over the issues
raised in step 2, experimental analyses also
must deal with observationally equivalent
subjects facing identical choice sets who
make different choices. Hence, experimental analyses also must think through
different ways of introducing unobserved
heterogeneity.
5.1.3 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Much of the literature estimating risk preferences using individual-level data focuses
on the insurance context. In this context,
economists have long discussed the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection,
and thus we comment on these issues here.32
In the context of insurance, moral hazard refers to the idea that individuals who
have more insurance coverage will have less
incentive to take care, and thus are more
likely to incur a loss—in other words, people’s risk is endogenous to their choices.
Such endogenous risk—which in principle
could arise in other environments as well—
can create problems in two ways for estimation of risk preferences. First, because it is
hard to account for it, many analyses assume
that it does not exist. For such analyses, if in
32 There is a large literature in economics that tests
for the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in
insurance markets. We briefly summarize the empirical
findings of that literature in the online appendix.
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fact moral hazard does exist, then estimates
of risk preferences might be biased. Second,
if moral hazard exists, then there must be a
reason why behavior is changing—e.g., in
the insurance context, the fact that people
take less care when they have more coverage
presumably reflects that they get some form
of utility from taking less care. If so, then this
feature of preferences should be incorporated into the analysis.
Adverse selection refers to the idea that
individuals who bear more risk (which is not
observable or cannot be priced) are more
likely to purchase higher insurance coverage.
Adverse selection clearly is a problem for the
insurance company. However, it is less of a
concern for a researcher trying to estimate
risk preferences as long as unobserved heterogeneity in risk can be taken into account,
even if this unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in
risk preferences.33
We conclude with raising one more issue
closely related to unobserved heterogeneity.
If there is unobserved heterogeneity in risk
preferences, then the researcher needs to be
confident that the choice sets faced by the
agents are independent of those risk preferences. In particular, risk preferences are
estimated by investigating how agents react
to changes in choice sets, and thus our estimates would be biased if a change in choice
sets were correlated with a change in risk
preferences. In the insurance context, for
instance, if an insurance company can easily
get a sense of a person’s risk preferences, the
company might be able to increase profits by
adjusting the insurance pricing in reaction to
those preferences. In practice, most insurance pricing is not done in this way—often
due to heavy regulation—and thus this issue
is perhaps less of a problem.

33 For a leading example, see Cohen and Einav (2007),
which is discussed in detail in section 5.2.
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5.2 Property-Insurance Data
Insurance choices are a natural domain
in which to estimate risk preferences. Due
to difficulties in obtaining data prior to the
2000s, there are relatively few papers that
use individual-level insurance data to carry
out this task.
The first paper to use individual-level
data on insurance choices to estimate risk
preferences is Cicchetti and Dubin (1994).
They analyze data from Mountain Bell on
roughly 10,000 residential telephone customers in Colorado in 1990. The choice of
interest is whether customers purchased
inside-wire insurance. This insurance cost
roughly $0.45 per month, and protected
against telephone-wire problems inside
one’s residence. Without the insurance,
in the event of a problem, the household
would need to pay the service cost to fix
the problem, which averaged about $55.
The probability of experiencing a problem
was roughly 0.5percent (see below), and
thus the expected benefit of the insurance
was roughly $0.275. Hence, purchasing this
insurance for $0.45 is a clear sign of aversion
to risk. Cicchetti and Dubin set out to get a
more precise understanding of this aversion
to risk.
In order to translate the field context
into the domain of preferences (a choice
between lotteries, as discussed in section
5.1), Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) assume
that households effectively choose between
the following two lotteries:
(−p, 1)

versus

(−L, μ; 0, 1 − μ).

The first lottery is that associated with the
choice to purchase the insurance, where p
is the premium charged for the insurance.
The second lottery is that associated with the
choice not to insure, where μis the probability of experiencing a problem within any
given month, and Lis the expected service

cost in the event of a problem.34 The authors
estimate μ
 using data on historical (1982–
86) trouble calls, where they divide the data
into nine zones, and they take the observed
ratio of trouble calls to customers in each
zone to be the probability of a problem
for customers in that zone. Then, in their
empirical analysis, they treat p, L, and μ as
data.
Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) estimate an
EU model with a HARA utility specification.
For prior wealth—a required input in the
HARA specification—they use a measure
of monthly income generated from census
data. They also allow the curvature of the
utility function to depend on a household’s
average monthly bill.35 In addition to estimating an EU model, they also estimate an
RDEU model with a parametrized form of
overweighting of probabilities—the one in
Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992).
They estimate these models by ML,
where they use a McFadden (1974)
random-utility specification to account

for observationally equivalent households
making heterogeneous choices. From their
estimates, Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) conclude that “the overall pattern of results is
remarkably consistent with expected utility theory” (p. 183). In particular, they find
virtually no evidence of overweighting of
probabilities—i.e., RDEU does no better
than EU—and they argue that 78 percent
of households have an estimated utility
function consistent with EU. Finally, they
note that, for the average household, the
estimated degree of absolute risk aversion
34 This formulation implicitly assumes that households
expect, at most, one problem in any given month. As we
mentioned in section 5.1, this type of assumption is common in the literature.
35 They motivate this assumption based on a reducedform finding that households with larger average monthly
bills are more likely to purchase inside-wire insurance.
While this assumption will capture that feature in their
structural estimation of risk preferences, it is not clear that
there is a good primitive justification for it.
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is relatively small and yields a willingness to
pay for the insurance virtually identical to
the expected benefit from the insurance.
The Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) paper
has a number of limitations. Perhaps most
important is a data limitation: their data
contain very little variation in p
 , L, and μ
 .36
Hence, their estimation primarily identifies
the impact of monthly income and average
monthly bill on the (local) degree of absolute risk aversion. Moreover, as we discussed
in section 4, the limited variation in p
 , L,
and μcreates a major impediment to separately identifying both utility curvature and
probability weighting, and thus their RDEU
estimates depend heavily on their functional-form assumptions for utility and probability weighting. As such, one should be
cautious in interpreting their estimates for
the degree of probability overweighting.
Finally, upon closer look, it is not so clear
how EU in fact fares. For the 22 percent of
households with an estimated utility function
inconsistent with EU, the inconsistency is in
the form of a decreasing utility function (i.e.,
less is better), which is clearly counterfactual.
Among the 78 percent of households with
an estimated utility function consistent with
EU, nearly half of them (37 percent of all
households) are estimated to be risk loving.
Moreover, in addition to permitting choices
to depend on risk preferences, Cicchetti and
Dubin (1994) also include a direct preference for insurance meant to reflect “shifts in
tastes and preferences that may be attributable to the insured versus uninsured states”
(perhaps due to a belief that households with
insurance will get priority service relative to
households without insurance). In the estimated model, this direct preference is estimated to be quite large and appears to be the
36 The paper seems to suggest that, in the estimation,
a single value of p
 and L
 is used for all households. While
there is some variation in μacross the nine zones, its range
of [0.32 percent, 0.74 percent]is very tight.
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main factor explaining the choice to purchase
insurance for many households.37 Despite
these limitations, the Cicchetti and Dubin
paper was the first of its kind in the domain
of insurance, and inspired later papers that
were able to work with better data and more
sophisticated models.
A key contribution in this direction is
made by Cohen and Einav (2007), which
provides a much more sophisticated analysis, although the authors limit themselves
to the EU framework. They use individual-level data from an insurance provider
in Israel, and analyze deductible choices
among households who purchased one particular form of auto insurance (similar to
comprehensive automobile insurance in the
United States). In their data, all households
have purchased the insurance, and the decision of interest is which of four deductible
options they chose. The data contain the full
menu of premium–deductible combinations
offered to each household, along with that
household’s chosen deductible. In addition,
they observe actual claims made by these
households during the policy year.
Since virtually all households (98.9 percent) chose one of the two lowest deductibles,
Cohen and Einav (2007) limit attention to
the choice between those two.38 Hence, they
translate the field context into the domain
of preferences—i.e., a choice between lotteries—by assuming that households were

37 Relative to the Rabin (2000) critique, this direct preference for insurance term is how they were able to explain
the purchase of insurance even at reasonable levels of risk
aversion. Yet, there has been some controversy on whether
the fact itself that individuals purchase insurance for such
small risk at a price that is twice the expected loss can be
considered consistent with EU theory, especially in light of
the relatively small estimates of absolute risk aversion; see,
e.g., Camerer (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), and FehrDuda and Epper (2012).
38 Cohen and Einav (2007) do not drop households that
chose one of the two high deductibles, but rather they proceed as if those households had chosen the highest remaining deductible.
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effectively choosing between the following
two lotteries:
	(−p  l  − dl  , μ; −p  l, 1 − μ)
versus
(−p  h  − dh  , μ;  −p  h, 1 − μ) .
The first lottery is that associated with the
choice of the lower deductible, and the second lottery is that associated with the choice
of the higher deductible. For each choice
k ∈ { l, h}, p  kis the premium charged for the
insurance, dk  is the deductible that must be
paid by the household in the event of a loss,
and μis the probability of experiencing a loss
during the policy period. The insurance is
typically priced such that lower deductibles
are actuarially unfair—i.e., a risk-neutral
household would choose the higher deductible dh  , and dl  would be optimal if the household is risk averse enough.39
This formulation reflects three simplifying assumptions. First, it assumes that each
household’s deductible choice does not
influence its claim probability μ
 —i.e., it
assumes that there is no moral hazard with
respect to the deductible choice. Second,
it assumes that every possible loss is larger
than the larger deductible d 
 h. Cohen and
Einav (2007) explicitly discuss these assumptions, and argue that they are supported in
their data. The third simplifying assumption
is that households make decisions while considering a policy period that is infinitesimally
small, thereby implicitly yielding that households ignore the possibility of incurring more
than one claim during the policy period. But
since multiple claims are rare (in their data,
only 2.70 percent of households experience
more than one claim over the one-year policy period), this assumption is probably not
39 Under their benchmark estimates of claim rates, this
is true for 98.7 percent of households (p. 752).

restrictive (as we discussed in section 5.1,
similar assumptions are made in subsequent
analyses).40
Cohen and Einav (2007) then estimate an
EU model with an NTD specification for the
utility function.41 Importantly, they permit
both observed heterogeneity (i.e., dependence on household observables) and unobserved heterogeneity in both the degree of
(absolute) risk aversion rand the likelihood
of a claim μ. Indeed, the main goal of their
analysis is to assess (i) the extent of such heterogeneity, (ii) the relative importance of
heterogeneity in risk versus in risk preferences, and (iii) the correlation between the
unobserved elements of the heterogeneity.
Formally, they assume that claims are generated by a Poisson process with Poisson claim
rate λ, and that rand λhave a bivariate lognormal distribution with
x  ′   β  
ρ σ  λ σ  r
σ  2  
ln λ  
  .
∼    N   i λ  ,    
  λ   
 
  i    iid
( ln r i )
([ x  ′i   β  r ] [ρ σ  λ σ  r
σ  2r   ])
In the above expression, σ 
 2λ   is the variance
2
of λ, σ  r  is the variance of r,and ρis their
correlation.
Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate this
model using an MCMC approach. The data
contain several key features that permit them
to parametrically identify the unobserved
heterogeneity in risk preferences and in
risk. First, they observe the full distribution
of (the number of) household claims over
the course of the one-year policy period.
This distribution permits them to directly
40 Although Cohen and Einav’s (2007) approach effectively assumes that households ignore the possibility of
multiple claims during the policy period, their estimation
still uses the full distribution of number of claims over the
policy period, because this distribution is needed to identify the variance and correlations of unobserved heterogeneity in risk (as we discuss below).
41 In fact, their utility equation is slightly different from
the one in section 3 because they consider a policy period
that is infinitesimally small.
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estimate the mean and variance of risk
(for a fixed set of observables) without any
reference to premium–deductible menus or
to choices.42 Second, different households
in the data are offered different menus of
( p  l  , dl  ) versus ( p  h  , dh  ).43 Seeing how
households respond to different menus

(while knowing the mean and variance of
risk) permits identification of the mean and
variance of risk aversion. Finally, seeing
how these responses differ between households with different claims experiences (i.e.,
households with a different number of actual
claims experienced during the one-year
policy period) permits identification of the
correlation between the unobserved components of risk and risk preferences.
Cohen and Einav’s (2007) estimation yields
several interesting conclusions. First, in terms
of the degree of risk aversion, mean risk
aversion is quite large (r = 0.0019), but in
fact the distribution is quite skewed and the
median is more reasonable (r = 0.0000073).
In other words, in the estimated model, the
roughly 18 percent of households that choose
the low deductible are primarily explained
by very high risk aversion. Second, they find
more unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion than in risk, and moreover, given their
estimates, the unobserved heterogeneity in
risk preferences is more important for profits
and pricing. Finally, they find a strong positive correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and unobserved
heterogeneity in risk. This is driven by the
fact that as the observed number of claims
42 Note that if they only observed whether or not house-

holds made any claims, they could only estimate the mean
claim rate. The variance of claim rates is identified by comparing the likelihood of at least one claim to the likelihoods
of at least two or more claims.
43 This variation is not purely idiosyncratic. For
instance, for two-thirds of households, the menu satisfies
dh    = 0.5 p  h, dl    = 0.3 p  h, and p  l  = 1.06 p  h, where the variation across households comes entirely from variation in p 
 h.
But there is some additional variation, which Cohen and
Einav (2007) discuss in some detail.
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increases, the proportion of households that
choose the low deductible increases rapidly. They are cautious in concluding too
much from this positive correlation, because
the unobservables that drive a correlation
between risk aversion and risk might be very
context specific.
Sydnor (2010) uses similar data to also
study the implications of EU for insurance
deductible choices. However, he does not
pursue an estimation of preferences, but
rather a calibration approach in the spirit
of Rabin (2000). Nonetheless, this paper
is instructive for those who want to estimate risk preferences using insurance data.
Sydnor uses individual-level data from a
large home insurance company, from which
he obtained a random sample of 50,000
home insurance policyholders in a single state in a single year. At this company,
each policyholder must choose one of four
deductibles—$1,000, $500, $250, or $100—
where a lower deductible implies a higher
premium. Much like Cohen and Einav
(2007), Sydnor observes the full menu of
premium–deductible combinations offered
to each household, along with that household’s chosen deductible. In addition, he
observes actual claims made by these households during the policy year, from which he
can derive claim rates.
Sydnor (2010) translates this field context
into the domain of preferences exactly as in
Cohen and Einav (2007), by assuming that
households are effectively choosing between
four lotteries of the form
	(−p  d  − d, μ;  −p  d  , 1 − μ) ,
where p  dis the premium charged for the
insurance, dis the deductible that must be
paid by the household in the event of a loss,
and μ
 is the probability of experiencing a loss
during the policy period. This formulation
reflects three simplifying assumptions similar to those in Cohen and Einav (2007).
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In his main analysis, Sydnor (2010) considers an EU model with CRRA utility, and he
calibrates the degree of relative risk aversion
(ρ) that households would need to have to
explain their choices. More precisely, for the
6,268 customers who were new at the sample firm in the sample year—and who thus
were more likely to have actively chosen
their deductible—he focuses on the 3,791
customers who chose either the $500 or the
$250 deductible.44 Choosing a deductible
smaller than the maximum ($1,000) reveals
an aversion to risk, and Sydnor calibrates for
each household a lower bound on how risk
averse that household must be. In his baseline calibration, he assigns to each household
a claim rate equal to the average claim rate
among those who chose that deductible,
and he assumes a prior wealth of $1 million.
He demonstrates that, for the vast majority of the households that chose deductibles smaller than $1,000, this specification
implies implausibly large risk aversion. He
further demonstrates that this finding is
robust to assuming a variety of values for
prior wealth and to assigning to each household a fitted claim rate (in much the same
way as described below for Barseghyan et al.
2013b). Based on these calibrations, Sydnor
concludes that EU is not a good explanation
of people’s deductible choices, and he then
discusses several potential alternative explanations, including risk misperceptions, probability weighting, and KR loss aversion.
Barseghyan et al. (2013b), BMOT henceforth, use similar data to estimate a probability distortion model (as described in section
4.4). In other words, they consider a model
that, in the insurance-deductible context,
nests EU, RDEU, KR loss aversion, Bell
or Gul disappointment aversion, and risk
misperceptions, and they investigate which
combination best explains the variation in
44 Because only 3 of the 6,268 new customers chose the
$100 deductible, he does not analyze that group.

the data.45 Their data come from a large
insurance company that sells multiple lines
of coverage. The full data set comprises
yearly information on more than 400,000
households who held auto or home policies
between 1998 and 2006. For their main
analysis, BMOT use a core data set of 4,170
households who were new customers at the
firm in 2005 or 2006 and who purchased
both home and auto insurance. The authors
focus on households’ initial choices. In this
group, every household made a deductible
choice for three coverages: home all-perils
insurance, auto collision insurance, and auto
comprehensive insurance. For each choice,
the data contain the full menu of premium–
deductible combinations offered to each
household, along with that household’s chosen deductible.46 In addition, the data contain the history of claims for all households.
The translation of the field domain into the
domain of lotteries is exactly as in Cohen and
Einav (2007) and Sydnor (2010), except that
BMOT make one further assumption: they
assume that households bracket the three
choices narrowly in the sense that, while each
household has fixed risk preferences that apply
to all three choices, the household treats these
choices as three independent decisions of the
form studied by Cohen and Einav (2007) and
Sydnor (2010). It is worth highlighting that
45 As discussed in section 4, BMOT can only identify
an overall probability distortion, and cannot break it down
into these possible underlying forces. Nonetheless, this
approach identifies the extent to which these underlying forces together might help better explain deductible
choices (relative to EU).
46 The available deductible options were the same for
all households. For home, the options were $100, $250,
$500, $1,000, $2,500, and $5,000; for collision, the options
were $100, $200, $250, $500, and $1,000; and for comprehensive, the options were $50, $100, $200, $250, $500, and
$1,000. In order to make it plausible that every potential
claim is larger than the largest deductible, BMOT exclude
the two highest deductibles in home (chosen by only
1.6 percent of households); households that chose such
deductibles are kept in the analysis and treated as if they
chose a $1,000 deductible (this approach is analogous to
that in Cohen and Einav 2007).
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the assumption of narrow bracketing is in
fact implicit in Cohen and Einav (2007) and
Sydnor (2010), in the sense that they assume
that people have risk preferences that apply to
their single observed deductible choice without reference to all the other risk choices that
households are making.47
BMOT estimate a probability distortion
model. Applied to the context of choosing deductibles, the utility from choosing
deductible d
  is
Ω(μ) u(w − p  d  − d)  + (1 − Ω(μ))  u(w − p  d),
where 
μis the (objective) probability of
a claim, u
 is a utility function, and Ω
 is a
probability distortion function. As a preliminary step, BMOT use the full sample and
the full history of claims to estimate, for each
coverage, a Poisson panel regression with
random effects. They then use the output
from these claim rate regressions to assign to
each household a fitted probability of a claim
for each coverage. In the estimation of preferences, these claim probabilities are treated
as data.48
In their benchmark analysis, BMOT estimate a model of homogeneous preferences,
i.e., where all households have the same utility function u
 and the same probability distortion function Ω. They assume an NTD
specification for u(see table 1; the analysis
is then repeated for CARA and CRRA utility
47 In their benchmark estimation, the only advantage
(relative to Cohen and Einav 2007) of having three choices
per household is that it yields increased variation in claim
probabilities and prices represented in the data. When
BMOT incorporate observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the analysis, this feature will then add a restriction
that each household must have the same risk preferences
across all three coverages.
48 They demonstrate that the main results are robust
to instead assigning to each household a fitted distribution of claim probabilities for each coverage. As such, the
approach in BMOT is roughly equivalent to that in Cohen
and Einav (2007), except that they do not permit the
unobserved heterogeneity in risk to be correlated with the
unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences.
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functions), but they take a 
nonparametric
approach to Ω

. Specifically, they consider
three nonparametric approaches: (i) a polynomial expansion of ln Ω(μ), (ii) a polynomial
expansion of Ω
 (μ), and (iii) a cubic spline. All
three approaches yield the same conclusion:
large probability distortions characterized by
substantial overweighting of claim probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability
changes. Moreover, while there also is statistically significant curvature in u, economically the lion’s share of households’ observed
aversion to risk is attributed to probability
distortions. This result represents a more convincing demonstration than Sydnor (2010) of
the limitations of EU in explaining deductible choices. Whereas Sydnor (2010) merely
provides calibration arguments against EU
based on the required curvature of the utility
function being “too large,” BMOT find that
a model with large probability distortions
better explains the data without imposing
any restrictions on the magnitude of curvature in the utility function. BMOT compare
special cases of models yielding probability
distortions, including KR loss aversion and
Gul disappointment aversion (see section
3.4 for details on these models), with the
nonparametric estimate of Ω
 (μ) ,to assess
whether these models are consistent with
the empirical evidence. The results show that
neither KR loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain the
estimated probability distortions, thereby
suggesting a key role for probability weighting in individuals’ deductible choices.
BMOT next expand their analysis to
incorporate both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in both the curvature of the
utility function and in the magnitude of the
probability distortions. When allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity, BMOT’s econometric model takes the form of a mixed
logit (with parametric assumptions on the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms), which they estimate via MCMC.
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The mean estimated probability distortions
in a model that allows for observed heterogeneity only, unobserved heterogeneity only,
or both, are nearly identical to each other
and to the estimated probability distortions
in a model with homogeneous preferences.
Hence, whether BMOT assume preferences
are homogeneous or allow for observed or
unobserved heterogeneity, their main message is the same. By contrast, the estimated
degree of standard risk aversion is somewhat
sensitive to the modeling approach. The variance estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity terms suggest a substantial presence of
unobserved heterogeneity (though smaller
than in Cohen and Einav 2007); unobserved heterogeneity in rand in probability
distortions are estimated to be negatively
correlated.
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum
(2016) use the same data and focus on the
same probability distortion model, where
they assume CARA utility. However, they
allow for completely unrestricted heterogeneity in rand Ω. Specifically, they assume
that each household has its own preferences
( r i  , Ω  i  ( ⋅ )), and they make the key identifying assumption that these preferences do not
change as the household makes risky choices
across the three distinct but closely related
property insurance contexts (we return to
a discussion of this stability assumption in
section 7.1). With this assumption, they can
partially identify (provide bounds for) each
household’s risk preferences.
In the probability distortion model, a
household’s deductible choice in coverage j
implies a lower and an upper bound on its
probability distortion as a function of r  i and
μ  j:
(6)	
LBi    ( r i  , μ  j) ≤ Ω  i  ( μ  j) ≤ UBi    ( r i  , μ  j).
Because the authors observe three choices
per household, typically with different μ 
 j,
they obtain three pairs of bounds—or

i ntervals—per household. Much as discussed
in section 5.1.2, however, some households
make choices that cannot be rationalized
))
, and thus the authors
by any 
( 
r i  , Ω  i  ( μ  j
exclude 13 percent of the households from
the analysis.49
Without further assumptions, the restrictions in equation (6) are all that can be learned
from the data and the model. However, the
various models reviewed in section 4.4 that
lead to probability distortions (with the
exception of Ω 
 i  ( ⋅ )representing subjective
beliefs) yield that the function Ω  i  ( ⋅ )is monotone in μ.The authors therefore focus on
exploring the identifying power of this shape
restriction to tighten the bounds, and then
explore four additional shape restrictions:
quadraticity, linearity, unit slope, and zero
intercept.50 Under each restriction, for each
household, the authors search for the minimal r isuch that the household’s intervals satisfy the shape restriction. They then analyze
that household’s lower and upper bounds
in equation (6) given that minimal 
r i. Of
course, for each successive restriction, more
households are excluded because there is no
( r i  , Ω  i  ( μ  j))that can rationalize their choices
while satisfying that shape restriction.
The authors first analyze the distribution of
the minimal r is under each shape restriction.
They find that this distribution is skewed to
the right in each case, and that the median
is zero under each nondegenerate shape
restriction (i.e., each shape restriction other
than zero intercept). Indeed, they find that
the vast majority of households—between
70 and 80 percent—can be rationalized by
49 In fact, while some of these households could be
rationalized with a very large r  i, the authors also choose to
exclude households that cannot be rationalized with an r  i
that lies in a reasonable range. Specifically, for reasons they
explain in section 5 of their paper, they require r i  < 0.0108.
50 The shape restrictions are cumulative. That is, quadraticity requires that Ω( ⋅ )is both monotone and quadratic, i.e., Ω(μ)   = a + bμ + cμ  2, b ≥ 0, and c ≥ − b / 2;
linearity requires Ω
 (μ)   = a + bμ, b ≥ 0; unit slope requires
Ω(μ)   = a + μ; and zero intercept requires Ω(μ)   = μ.
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a model with linear utility given monotone,
quadratic, or even linear probability distortions. By contrast, they find that fewer than
40 percent can be rationalized by a model
with concave utility but no probability distortions. Next, they use the intervals to perform
kernel regressions of the lower and upper
bounds on Ω
 (μ)as a function of μ
 (under each
restriction including only households that
can be rationalized under that restriction).
Under each nondegenerate shape restriction, the results evince a distortion function
that substantially overweights small probabilities. Under monotonicity, for instance,
the midpoints of the estimated bounds
imply Ω
(0.02) = 0.11, Ω(0.05) = 0.17,
and Ω
 (0.10) = 0.25
, and even the estimated lower bounds imply Ω
 (0.02) = 0.07,
Ω(0.05) = 0.12
, and 
Ω(0.10) = 0.15.
The results are very similar under quadraticity and linearity. Moreover, these
results are largely consistent with the
results in BMOT, which were obtained
under more stringent functional form
assumptions.
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum
(2016) further show how one can utilize the
intervals to obtain a point estimate Ω
 ( ⋅ ) for
the representative household without relying
on parametric assumptions about the nature
of unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically,
they build an estimator based on finding the
Ω( ⋅ )that comes closest to rationalizing the
behavior of households with monotone Ω( ⋅ ).
The estimated Ω( ⋅ )can rationalize all three
choices of nearly one in five households
whose behavior is consistent with monotone
probability distortions. Moreover, the residual
deviation between the households’ intervals
and the estimated Ω( ⋅ )allows one to uncover
the lower bound on the degree of heterogeneity in probability distortions among households. An interesting next step for future
research is to generalize this approach to
broader models of decision making under
uncertainty.
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5.3 Game Shows
Several papers estimate risk preferences
using data from television game shows.
Game shows provide an attractive setting
for estimating EU and non-EU models.
Contestants “are presented with well-defined choices where the stakes are real and
sizable, and the tasks are repeated in the
same manner from contestant to contestant”
(Andersen et al. 2008, p. 361). Field settings
rarely have such desirable characteristics.
That said, a game show is conducted in a
peculiar environment that raises concerns
about ecological and external validity and
observer and selection bias. For this reason,
we provide only a brief discussion of the pioneers of the literature and references to a
selection of other studies.
The pioneers of the game-show literature
include Gertner (1993), who uses data from
Card Sharks, Metrick (1995), who uses data
from Jeopardy!, and Beetsma and Schotman
(2001), who use data from the Dutch show
Lingo.
Gertner (1993) assumes that Card Sharks
contestants are EU maximizers with CARA
utility and pursues two methods for estimating the lower bound on the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, 
r. First,
Gertner looks solely at the contestants’ bets
in the final round of the game and obtains
a lower bound on each contestant’s 
r by
assuming that a contestant who wagers her
entire stake is risk neutral and a contestant
who wagers the minimum amount (half
of her stake) wishes to bet exactly that. He
reports an average lower bound of 0.000310.
Second, Gertner looks at the contestants’
bets in all rounds and compares the sample
distribution of outcomes with the distribution of outcomes if a contestant plays the
optimal strategy for a risk-neutral contestant. By revealed preference, an “average”
contestant prefers the former distribution to
the latter, and so the degree of absolute risk
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aversion that would make a contestant indifferent between the two distributions provides an estimate of the average lower bound
on r. Under this method, Gertner reports an
average lower bound of 0.0000711.51
Metrick (1995) also models Jeopardy!
contestants as EU maximizers with CARA
utility. In the pertinent part of the paper,
Metrick looks only at the bets of the leaders
in the final round of “runaway” games, i.e.,
games in which the leader is so far ahead
entering the final round that she can guarantee a win by betting a sufficiently small
amount. From the first-order necessary
condition of the leader’s utility maximization problem, Metrick derives an expression for the leader’s subjective probability
of answering correctly given her bet and
coefficient of absolute risk aversion r . This
expression is exactly the form of a logit
regression. He then obtains an ML estimate
of rfor the “representative” contestant (i.e.,
he obtains the r that maximizes the likelihood of the observed sample of bets and
correct/incorrect answers). He reports a
statistically insignificant point estimate of
0.000066.52
Beetsma and Schotman (2001) consider
EU maximization with both CRRA and
CARA utility functions. They analyze the
decision at the start of a round in the Lingo
51 In the second part of the paper, Gertner (1993) presents evidence that contestants’ bets are inconsistent with
EU maximization. More specifically, he finds that contestants’ bets exhibit sensitivity to accumulated winnings in
the current round (stakes), but not to accumulated winnings in previous rounds (wealth).
52 In another part of the paper, Metrick (1995) looks at
the bets of the first- and second-place contestants entering
the final round of games in which these contestants can
mostly ignore the actions of the third contestant. In this
part, however, Metrick does not focus on estimating the
contestants’ risk preferences. Rather, he focuses on testing
whether the contestants play “empirical-best-responses,”
i.e., best-responses to the empirical frequency of strategies
played by their opponents in his sample of similar games.
He finds that while first-place contestants generally play
empirical-best-responses, second-place contestants do not.

finals to stop or continue play of the game.
They first show that, under fairly weak conditions, the stop/play decision amounts to a
choice between receiving the current stake
xwith certainty and a lottery in which they
receive 2xwith probability p
 and a with probability 1 − p, where arepresents the option
value of coming back in the next show.53
They then specify a probit model for the
stop/play decision and estimate the degree
of risk aversion. For the CRRA specification,
they estimate coefficients of relative risk
aversion ranging from 0 .42(assuming zero
wealth) to 6.99(assuming wealth of 50,000
Dutch guilders) to 1 3.08(assuming wealth
of 100,000 Dutch guilders). For the CARA
specification, they estimate a coefficient of
absolute risk aversion of 0.12.
Most of the subsequent papers in the
game-show literature use data from the
United States and international versions of Deal or No Deal. For surveys, see
Andersen et al. (2008), Post et al. (2008),
and Hartley, Lanot, and Walker (2014). Two
exceptions are Fullenkamp, Tenorio, and
Battalio (2003), who use data from Hoosier
Millionaire, and Hartley, Lanot, and Walker
(2014), who use data from Who Wants to be
a Millionaire? Like the pioneering studies,
many of the subsequent papers work with
EU models with CRRA and/or CARA utility (e.g., Fullenkamp, Tenorio, and Battalio
2003; Andersen et al. 2008; Deck, Lee, and
Reyes 2008; Conte et al. 2012; Hartley,
Lanot, and Walker 2014). Others go beyond
EU and consider RDEU, prospect theory, or
other non-EU models (e.g., Botti et al. 2008;
Post et al. 2008; Mulino et al. 2009; de Roos
and Sarafidis 2010; Bombardini and Trebbi
2012).

53 Under the rules of the game, if contestants lose, they
can come back in the next show unless the current show
is their third.
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5.4 Health-Insurance Data
Recently, a growing empirical literature
has made use of structural models of decision making under uncertainty to answer a
variety of important questions about healthinsurance markets. These include, inter
alia, the welfare cost of inertia and imperfect information in health insurance and the
implications of adverse selection and moral
hazard in these markets.
However, the health insurance field context has not been used for estimation of risk
preferences as the object of fundamental
interest. We suspect the reason is that estimation of risk preferences when using healthinsurance choices is more challenging than
it is when using property-insurance choices
for at least three reasons. First, the set of
outcomes associated with each lottery is
significantly more complex; for example,
health expenses have (essentially) a continuous distribution. Second, individuals may
care about more than mere monetary costs
of care; for example, the quality of their life
is differentially impacted by different health
outcomes. The researcher then either needs
to model the utility from each possible health
status directly, or to monetize health status.
Third, moral hazard is likely to be a larger
concern in this context. In particular, if individuals’ choices of health-insurance plans
are subject to selection on moral hazard, this
selection cannot be ignored in the estimation
of preferences.54
Even when the ultimate target of the analysis is not estimation of risk preferences, the
literature studying health-insurance choices
needs to contend with the difficulties listed
54 Yet another issue is that health-insurance plans can be
quite complex, and thus there might be issues of consumer
competence with these plans that bias the estimation of
risk preferences. Indeed, Bhargava, Loewenstein, and
Sydnor (2017) find evidence of large numbers of employees at one company choosing health-insurance plans that
are dominated by other available options.
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above. One approach has been to not model
directly individuals’ risk aversion and simplify the problem by posing a reduced-form
equation for individuals’ valuation of health
insurance plans; see for example Starc
(2014). Another approach has been to exogenously impose risk preferences, as opposed
to estimating risk preferences within a larger
model. See, for example, Einav, Finkelstein,
and Schrimpf (2010), who use external data
to calibrate the values for risk aversion (as
well as other parameters that would only be
identified via functional form assumptions in
their model).
Because of this, we substantially limit
the depth of our coverage of this literature.
Nevertheless, we highlight a few recent
papers that address some of these challenges
and estimate a fully specified EU model with
CARA preferences. In certain cases, these
papers also allow for preference heterogeneity across individuals. We expect that these
contributions could facilitate future work
that focuses on estimating risk preferences.
Handel (2013) leverages a major change to
insurance provision that occurred at a large
firm to quantify the welfare cost of consumer
inertia in health insurance markets, and to
study policies that could mitigate this inertia.
In order to make progress on this important question, Handel assumes away two of
the challenges listed above: he assumes that
there is no moral hazard and that individuals
base their choice of insurance plan only on
the monetary costs of each option. However,
Handel uses a very careful approach
to account for complex lotteries over
outcomes.
Handel (2013) observes households
choosing among three “preferred provider
organization” (PPO) plans, denoted PPO 250  ,
PPO 500 and PPO 1200 .These PPO plans differ among each other in their premiums and
cost-sharing characteristics (e.g., deductible,
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximums).
These characteristics, in turn, determine the
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mapping from total medical expenditures to
employee out-of-pocket expenditures.
The households in the sample are
observed making insurance-plan choices at
multiple points in time. Specifically, at time
t = 0, they are observed making an “active”
choice, because the company changed the
plans offered (their premiums and cost-sharing characteristics) and the households had
to choose a plan among the new offerings.
At times 
t = 1and 
t = 2,households are
observed making (potentially) “passive”
choices, in the sense that they may simply
continue with the plan chosen at time t = 0
without reassessing their options. Of notice is
the fact that, over time, the PPO 250 (the plan
that yields the more comprehensive coverage) becomes substantially more expensive,
while the PPO 500(a plan that yields a lower
coverage) becomes substantially less expensive; see figure 2 in Handel (2013). As such,
choices that were optimal at time t = 0 need
not be optimal at times t = 1, 2.
Handel’s interest is in quantifying the
effect of the inertia displayed by individuals
who do not change their plan over time. To
achieve this goal, he sets up a random-utility model of insurance choice, similar to the
one in BMOT described above. One important difference is that, in the case of health
insurance, the lottery is defined over outof-pocket expenditures, rather than over
binary outcomes. The distribution of out-ofpocket expenditures is assumed known by
the households. In practice, it is estimated
using medical predictive software, household characteristics, and ex post claim realizations. Specifically, for each individual and
open enrollment period, the author uses the
past year of diagnoses, drugs, and expenses,
along with age and gender, to predict mean
total medical expenditures for the upcoming year using the Johns Hopkins ACG
Case-Mix software package. He then incorporates medically relevant metrics such as
type and duration of specific conditions, as

well as comorbidities. This is done for four
distinct types of expenditures: (i) pharmacy;
(ii) mental health; (iii) physician office visit;
and (iv) hospital, outpatient, and all other.
Individuals are then grouped into cells determined by the mean predicted future utilization. For each expenditure type and risk cell,
Handel estimates a spending distribution for
the upcoming year based on ex post observed
cost realizations, combining the marginal
distributions across expenditure categories
into joint distributions using empirical correlations and copula methods. He then maps
individual total expense projections into the
family out-of-pocket expense projections,
taking into account family-level plan characteristics. This yields the distribution of
out-of-pocket expenditures to be used in the
choice model.
The effect of inertia is modeled as an
additive “consumption” term that is positive
for the chosen option in the previous year,
yielding
  
c 0  =  w 0  − p 0  − e 0  ,
  
c 1  =  w 1  − p 1  − e 1  + ηI(IC1    = IC0  ),
where c t denotes consumption, w t denotes
wealth, p tdenotes price of insurance, e t
denotes out-of-pocket expenditure, each at
time t ∈ { 0, 1}, ICt   denotes insurance plan
chosen at time t ∈ { 0, 1},and I( ⋅ )is the indicator function of the event in parenthesis.
In addition, for households with a very high
medical expenditure risk, the consumption
equation includes an additional dummy variable that puts additional weight on the most
comprehensive choice, P 250, to capture the
idea that essentially all of these households
have chosen P 250  .
The so-specified consumption enters
a CARA utility function, which in turn
households use to evaluate the three PPO
options (by integrating it against the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditure). Then
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 ouseholds choose the option with the highh
est EU.
The coefficient of risk aversion ris modeled as a random coefficient (following a
normal distribution with mean specified as
a linear function of observable characteristics), while the coefficient of inertia ηis modeled as a linear function of family status and
demographics. The resulting econometrics
model is a mixed logit and is estimated via
MCMC. Unobserved heterogeneity in risk,
however, is not allowed for.
The estimates of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion are similar in magnitude to the ones in BMOT, and they lie in
[1.9, 3.25 ]   ⋅ 10  −4 .The intercept in the inertia function, η ,is estimated to be large in
magnitude with values of $1,729 for single
employees and of $2,480 for employees who
cover at least one dependent. Because inertia
is linked to multiple dimensions of observable heterogeneity, Handel also reports the
estimated mean and variance of inertia:
The mean total money left on the table per
employee due to inertia is $2,032 with a standard deviation of $446.
A natural extension of Handel’s (2013)
model is to study additional frictions that may
affect an individual’s choice of insurance plans.
For example, Handel and Kolstad (2015) study
the effect of information frictions and hassle
costs, measured via a survey administered to
individuals for whom health-insurance information is available. The survey elicits individuals’ information about available medical
providers/treatments and perceived time and
hassle costs to learn the characteristics of a
high-deductible health-insurance plan (which
is cheaper than the other options). The additional friction measures appear to be important predictors of choices and to significantly
decrease risk preference estimates.
Einav et al. (2013) address the difficulties associated with evaluation of outcomes
in the health insurance context, as well as
the presence of moral hazard. In particular,
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moral hazard and its impact on selection is
the focus of their paper.
The authors begin their analysis with the
key observation that households’ utilization
rate of medical services may depend significantly on the characteristics of their health
insurance coverage. They propose the following simple model, which builds on a
model in Cardon and Hendel (2001). Each
period is divided into two subperiods. In the
second subperiod, households take insurance
coverage as given, and their utility function is
assumed separable in health and money
	
u(m; λ, ω)   = h(m − λ; ω)  + y(m) ,
where mis the monetary value of the health
care utilization chosen; λ
 is the monetary
value of the health shock; y(m)is the residual income, which is decreasing in mat a
rate that depends on the health-insurance
coverage; and ωis a parameter that captures
households’ responsiveness to the price of
medical utilization.
The authors assume that h
(m − λ; ω)
1   (m − λ)  2and that, under
= m − λ −  ___
2ω
insurance contract 
j,the marginal cost of
health care is c j (i.e., y′ (m)   = − c j ). It follows
that the optimal amount of utilization is
(7)	m j∗    (λ)   = λ + ω(1 − c j).
While these assumptions are quite strong,
they play a key role in keeping the model
tractable. In particular, through equation
(7) the authors assure that the health shock
contributes to utilization additively separably
from the contribution of moral hazard.
Denoting by F 
 λ  ( ⋅ )the distribution of the
health shock, the authors aim at identifying
F λ  ( ⋅ )and ω.To argue that these functionals
are point identified, the authors rely heavily
on (i) the fact that incremental utilization,
which is observed, does not depend on risk
aversion, but on ω;and (ii) that the data
contains a plausibly exogenous change in
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the entire menu of health coverage options.
First, the authors consider a counter-factual
(but ideal) data setting in which one observes
each household’s entire distribution of medical expenditure for two different coverages
(denoted 
Iand 
II
), call them G 
 iI    (m) and
II
. Assuming that the distribution of
G i    (m)
observed health shocks F λ  ( ⋅ )is the same
under both coverages, using the fact that
expenditure should equal λ + ω(1 − c j), and
denoting by E Gi  k   (m)the expected value of utilization under distribution G 
 ik    (m), k ∈ { I, II},
it immediately follows that the difference
( E Gi  I   (m)  − E Gi  II   (m))/( c I  − c II) uncovers the
parameter ω
 .The distribution F 
 i, λ  ( ⋅ ) for
each individual ican also be learned. This is
because the authors observe panel data. If
individuals within this panel are observed for
a sufficiently long period under the different
coverages, and if F 
 i, λ  ( ⋅ )is time invariant,
then Fi  , λ  ( ⋅ )can be learned recalling that
λ  it  = m it  − ω  i  (1 − c t), with tdenoting time
period.
Risk aversion is introduced in the analysis by monetizing the second-period utility
u( m j∗    (λ); λ, ω)and using this object as the
argument of a CARA utility function with
coefficient of risk aversion r .Hence, the EU
from coverage jin this model is
EUj  ω    = −  __1r  ∫    exp (−u(m j∗  (λ); λ, ω)) dFλ    (λ).




An individual specific coefficient of standard
risk aversion r  ican then be identified if individuals face a continuous option set.
The authors argue that the data they have
comes sufficiently close to this ideal scenario.
Specifically, their data hails from Alcoa, Inc.,
a large multinational producer of aluminum and related products, and it comprises
health insurance choices and medical care
utilization of their US-based workers (and
their dependents). The analysis in this paper
focuses mostly on data from the years 2003
and 2004. The data are very rich, document-

ing health insurance options and choices,
claim information, demographic characteristics of households, etc., as well as a summary
proxy of individuals’ health-care utilization
based on predictive medical software.
For this paper, the distinctive feature of
the data is that in 2004 Alcoa introduced a
new set of health insurance PPO options,
which were phased in gradually to different
employees based on their union affiliation,
since new benefits could only be introduced
when an existing union contract expired.
The staggered timing in the transition from
one set of insurance options to another
provides a plausibly exogenous source of
variation in coverage (mimicking the possibility of observing distributions G 
 iI  (m) and
II
Gi    (m)from the ideal scenario) which is, as
discussed above, the key to identification.
Prior to 2004, there were three PPO options
under the old benefits and five entirely different PPO options under the new benefits.
Hence, workers were forced to make an active
choice.
In practice, to estimate the model the
authors impose a parametric structure on
the distribution function F λ  ( ⋅ )and on the
form of unobserved heterogeneity. Because
of the model’s fairly complex structure,
estimation is carried out via MCMC. The
estimation exercise yields an average coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 1 .9 ⋅ 10  −3,
with a large standard deviation of 2 ⋅ 10  −3.
However, in this exercise risk aversion is no
longer specified over financial outcomes,
but over realized utility. As such, these estimates are not directly comparable to those
obtained in the papers discussed earlier in
this section.
The average value for ωis about $1,300,
which corresponds to one-third of the
average health risk (about $4,340) per
employee-year. In other words, on average,
moving from no insurance to full insurance
yields an increase in medical utilization of
$1,300.
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The authors interpret the parameter ω as
(a measure of) moral hazard. In essence, ω

maps the change in health insurance coverage into a change in utilization rate. And just
like in the textbook version of adverse selection, ceteris paribus, individuals with higher
moral hazard (higher ω

) will have higher
willingness to pay for insurance and will be
more costly to insure.
6.

Estimation with Aggregate Data

In this section, we turn our attention to
research that estimates risk preferences using
aggregate data. As in the prior section, we
first discuss the general approach, and then
review how that approach has been applied
in several different contexts. Aggregate data
has the major advantage that it is more easily
obtained than individual-level data. As will
become clear, however, estimation of risk
preferences using aggregate data typically
requires stronger assumptions about the
underlying environment.
6.1 The General Approach
Estimating risk preferences from aggregate data requires steps that are similar to
the ones faced when working with individual-level data, though with more structure
imposed:
Step 1: Identify a field context in which
economic agents make choices between
options that involve risk, and where those
choices determine some observed market aggregate for which the researcher can
obtain data. Examples include asset prices,
consumption aggregates, and labor supply
elasticities.
Step 2: Translate the (typically) rich field
environment into a well-defined market equilibrium model. Specifically, develop a model
of choice (as in step 2 for individual-level
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data) and a model of market forces such that,
for the model of risk preferences under consideration, the market equilibrium model
generates a prediction for the observed equilibrium market aggregates as a function of
the taste parameters.
When using aggregate data, researchers
frequently assume a representative agent,
sometimes for simplicity—in particular, to
make it easier to derive the mapping from
model parameters to observed market
aggregates—and sometimes due to there
being limited information in the data from
which one could identify either observed
or unobserved heterogeneity. Recently,
however, some researchers have shown
that if one observes (arguably) the same
set of agents interacting in multiple markets, then one can leverage techniques
from the empirical industrial organization
literature to estimate a model with heterogeneity in beliefs or in preferences (see
section 6.2.2).
6.2 Betting Markets
A large literature estimates risk preferences using aggregate odds data from
pari-mutuel horse races. In a pari-mutuel
horse race, the total amount wagered net of
a house take is distributed among the winning bettors in proportion to their individual
bets. Specifically, suppose there are n horses
in a race, and the share of the betting pool
wagered on horse i is s i. If the house take
is τ, the net return on a one-dollar bet on
horse i , or equivalently the “odds” on horse i,
is given by
1 −  τ − 1.
(8)	R i  =  _____
s  i
Typically, researchers working in this field
context have access to data that contain,
for each race, an observed vector of odds
)and the identity of the
R = (R1    , … , Rn  
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 inning horse (and sometimes also the idenw
tity of the other horse placements). The
literature takes advantage of the fact that,
from R, one can mechanically compute the
house take and the vector of betting shares.
Specifically, using the fact that the betting
shares must sum to one,
−1

1     .
(9)	1 − τ =   ∑   ______
(i=1 1 + Ri   )
n

The betting shares are then computed using
equation (8):
(1 − τ)
(10)	s i  =  _______   .
(1 + Ri  )
Hence, the literature typically takes R
 , s, and
τto be observed.55
The conceptual framework behind the
estimation of preferences from such data is
as follows. The underlying primitives of a
race are the house take τ and a vector of win
probabilities p ≡ ( p 1  ,   … , p n) ≫ 0, where p i
is the probability that horse i wins the race.56
Given a specific vector of odds R, bettors’
preferences determine which horse they bet
on, which in turn determines a set of market shares s ≡ ( s 1  , … , s n). In equilibrium,
the odds must adjust such that the shares
implied by bettor behavior correspond to
the shares implied by the pari-mutuel pricing rule (equations (9) and (10)). The goal
is to use the observed equilibrium odds and
race outcomes to make inferences about the
unobserved preferences.

55 To be precise, while a specific s can be associated with
multiple R via different τ, any observed R is associated
with a unique pair ( s, τ).
56 Here in section 6.2, in the interest of using notation
consistent with that in the betting-markets literature, we
make a temporary shift in our notation and use pto denote
probabilities (as opposed to prices).

6.2.1 Representative Agent Framework
Most studies that use pari-mutuel horse
race data adopt a representative agent
framework. The key implication is that, for
each race, the equilibrium odds R must be
such that the representative agent is indifferent between betting on all horses in the race.
The earliest research in this area effectively tests whether bettors maximize
expected value. In a seminal paper, Griffith
(1949) uses data on a sample of 1,386 US
horse races to study bettors’ subjective risk
perceptions. Griffith takes bettors’ subjective
win probabilities (which he labels the “psychological odds”) to be the reciprocal of the
track odds corrected for the house take.57
He then compares these inferred subjective
win probabilities to objective win probabilities. To do so, he groups horses into eleven
odds-groups (e.g., all horses that went off at
, etc.), and he compares in
Ri    = 1, Ri    = 2
each group the empirical win frequencies
and the subjective win probabilities. He
finds that the subjective win probabilities
exceed the frequency of winners at short
odds (corrected odds less than 5.1-to-1),
while the reverse holds at long odds. This
phenomenon has come to be known as the
“favorite–longshot bias.”58
Weitzman (1965) takes a somewhat different approach, effectively using horse race
data to estimate an EU model. Like Griffith
(1949), he first estimates the relationship
between empirical win frequencies and a
57 In particular, if the subjective win probability is taken
to be (1 − τ)/(Ri    + 1), then the expected value is the same
(and equal to 1 − τ) for bets on all horses. Griffith (1949)
also adds a correction for “breakage,” wherein tracks round
the odds downward to the nearest $0.05.
58 Griffith (1961) reports similar findings in a follow-up
study in which he turns attention from win bets to show
bets. McGlothlin (1956) pursues a similar approach to
Griffith (1949) and reaches the same conclusion using data
from 9,248 California horse races. He further identifies
changes in behavior over the course of a day’s races that he
takes to be inconsistent with the EU model.
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horse’s odds, using data from over 12,000
New York horse races. Specifically, for all
257 observed values of odds R
 , he computes the empirical frequency of winners
p.59 He then smooths this relationship by
taking the 257 (R, p)pairs and fitting them to
a curve p
 ̂ (R)using weighted least squares.60
Unlike Griffith (1949), who then uses the
odds to infer the representative agent’s
beliefs, Weitzman assumes that the representative agent has beliefs that correspond to
p̂ (R). Upon assuming that the agent behaves
according to the EU model, he can infer the
agent’s utility function over money. In particular, normalizing 
u(0)   = 0, indifference
between all bets implies 
p̂ (R) u(R)   = C,
or u
(R)   = C/p̂ (R)
, where C
 is a constant
(reflecting the scale of utility). The estimated shape of p
̂ (R)implies that u
(R)
is convex (increasing marginal utility for
money), suggesting a region of local risk loving similar to that proposed by Markowitz
(1952).
The first wave of papers culminates with
Ali (1977). Using data on more than 20,000
New York harness races, Ali repeats the analyses of both Griffith (1949) and Weitzman
(1965). However, he takes a different
approach to grouping horses. In particular,
he points out that the approach to estimating empirical win probabilities as a function
of odds Rignores the fact that the relationship might depend on which other horses
are in the race—e.g., a horse with 3-to-1
odds might be the favorite, the second favorite, or perhaps even the third favorite, and
might thus have different win probabilities
in each of those cases. To account for this,
he instead groups horses according to “favorites,” where each race will have a favorite, second favorite, third favorite, and so
59 In his data, odds are observed in $0.05 increments.
60 He tests several functional forms and concludes that

the most appropriate function is the hyperbolic form,
p̂ (R)   = A / R + B log (1 + R)/R.
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forth.61 It is unclear whether this alternative grouping is an improvement and, more
to the point, it is unclear what underlying
model of preferences might make this particular grouping the relevant one. However, the
point Ali raises about the race composition is
important, and it is picked up by Jullien and
Salanié (2000).
As in Griffith (1949), Ali first estimates
the subjective and empirical win probabilities for each of his groupings. He again
finds evidence of a favorite–longshot bias.
Specifically, the subjective win probability
for the favorite is less than the objective win
probability, whereas for all other horses the
subjective win probability is larger than the
objective win probability. As in Weitzman
(1965), Ali reverts to assuming that the representative agent’s beliefs correspond to the
objective win probabilities. To generate the
odds associated with each group, he computes a weighted average of the actual odds
for that group. He can then infer u(R) for
each of these values of R. As in Weitzman
(1965), the estimated shape of u(R)is convex. By pursuing both approaches, the paper
foreshadows the identification problem of
inferring preferences versus beliefs.
In addition to reporting these empirical
findings, Ali makes two important theoretical points. First, he observes that the utility function of the representative bettor is
inconsistent with the EU hypothesis when
the betting opportunity set is expanded to
include parlay, martingale, and other compound bets (a point that is leveraged by
Snowberg and Wolfers 2010; see below).
Second, he proves that the favorite–longshot
bias can be explained with bettors that are
risk neutral EU maximizers but have heterogeneous risk perceptions (a point that is

61 Because the vast majority of races in his sample have,
at most, eight horses, Ali (1977) carries out his analysis for
the first eight favorites.

544

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (June 2018)

developed by Gandhi and Serrano-Padial
2015; see below).
Jullien and Salanié (2000) initiated a second wave of research using pari-mutuel
horse race data that uses more sophisticated
econometric techniques to estimate risk
preferences. They use data from more than
34,000 horse races in Great Britain. In the
spirit of Weitzman (1965), they assume that
bettors’ beliefs correspond to the objective
win probabilities, and then estimate several
different models of risk preferences, namely,
EU, RDEU, and CPT.
Jullien and Salanié had a key innovation
that solves the issue raised by Ali (1977)
that the probability of a horse winning a
race depends on the other horses in the
race. Specifically, they use the fact that, as
long as bettors’ preferences satisfy certain
conditions, any vector of observed odds
R ≡ ( R1  , … , Rn  ) implies a unique underlying
vector of win probabilities p ≡ ( p 1  ,   … , p n).
Hence, if one can derive the mapping from
Rto p, one can use maximum likelihood
to find the preferences that make the
model-implied win probabilities as close as
possible to the empirical win frequencies
observed in the data on a race-by-race basis.
Formally, they assume a large number of
identical bettors. Each bettor bets a fixed
amount 
ain each race (and doesn’t consider the possibility of not betting), bets that
entire amount on one horse, and these bets
cover every horse in the race.62 The bettors
have identical preferences wherein the utility from betting a on horse iis V(Ri    , p i  , θ),
where θis a vector that parametrizes preferences—i.e., for any particular model of
risk preferences that they consider, the goal
will be to estimate the vector θ . Under these
assumptions, the market odds R in each race
62 Jullien and Salanié (2000) emphasize that their
approach, in principle, allows for insider traders and noise
traders, as long as the share of such traders is small enough
that they don’t influence the market odds.

will adjust such that the utility from betting
on all horses in that race is the same:
(11) 
V(R1  , p 1, θ)   = ⋯ = V(Rn  , p n, θ) .
Jullien and Salanié argue that, as long as V
  is
continuous and increasing in R i and p i (i.e.,
satisfies first-order stochastic dominance),
then each pair ( R, θ)generates a unique vector of win probabilities p.63
With this result in hand, Jullien and Salanié
(2000) can estimate θusing maximum likelihood. For each race, they number horses so
that horse 1is the winner. Indexing races by
c = 1, …, C, the log-likelihood for the sample is
C

	L  C(θ)   =   ∑  log p 1  ( R  c, θ),
c=1

c

where R  are the observed odds for race c
and p 1( R  c, θ)is the objective win probability
for the winning horse implied by R 
 c and θ.
Jullien and Salanié (2000) first apply this
approach to EU models. Here, the market
equilibrium condition (11) implies
p i  u(w + a Ri    , θ)  + (1 − p i)u(w − a, θ)  
= constant

for all i = 1, … , n,

where w
is the bettor’s initial wealth.
Using these nequations and the fact that
∑
 ni=1 p i  = 1, they obtain
[u(w + a Ri    , θ)  − u(w − a, θ)]  −1
________________________
p i  (R, θ) =    
   
  n
   .
−1
∑
 j=1 [u(w + a Rj    , θ)  − u(w − a, θ)]  

63 Jullien and Salanié (2000) formally prove that, for
any θ , there is a one-to-one relationship between R and p.
However, they do not explicitly address the conditions
required for how Vdepends on θto ensure a one-to-one
relationship between ( R, θ) and p, which is what would be
needed for full identification of θ. For models in which θ is
unidimensional and changes in θ have a monotonic impact
on risk aversion—as in single parameter EU models—the
latter would clearly be satisfied. For models in which θ is
multidimensional, it might not be satisfied.
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Estimation of the EU model with a CARA
utility function u
(x, θ)   = (1 − exp (−θx))/θ
(for which only θais identified) yields an
estimate of θ̂ a = − 0.055
, thereby indicating that bettors are risk loving. This result
is consistent with the findings in Weitzman
(1965) and Ali (1977), and follows from the
fact that their data again contains evidence of
a favorite–longshot bias. Similar results are
obtained with a HARA utility function.
Jullien and Salanié (2000) next estimate
various RDEU models. With RDEU, the
market equilibrium condition implies
π( p i  , θ) u(w + a Ri    , θ)
  + (1 − π( p i  , θ)) u(w − a, θ)   = constant
for all i = 1, … , n.
Much as under EU, one can use these n
equations, the inverse function of π( ⋅ , θ), and
the fact that ∑
 ni=1 p i  = 1to obtain p i  (R, θ).
They assume a CARA utility function, and
functional forms for π( ⋅ , θ)include a power
function and those proposed by Lattimore,
Baker, and Witte (1992) and Prelec (1998).64
The estimation results indicate that a power
function and the Lattimore, Baker, and Witte
(1992) function do not fit the data better than
the EU model (in the sense of value of the
likelihood function), and that the estimate
θ̂ ais essentially unaffected. Estimation of the
Prelec (1998) model yields a better fit to the
data and suggests rejection of EU in favor of
RDEU. However, the estimated weighting
function is quite close to the diagonal.
Finally, Jullien and Salanié (2000) estimate
CPT models. With CPT, and assuming that

64 In fact, they separately estimate the Lattimore,
Baker, and Witte (1992) function and the Cicchetti and
Dubin (1994) function, but the latter is equivalent to the
former (with a simple change in variables).
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wis the reference point, the market equilibrium condition implies
π  + ( p i  , θ) u(aRi    , θ)  + π  −  (1 − p i  , θ) u(−a, θ)  
= constant

for all i = 1, … , n.

The approach to solving for p i  (R, θ)is analogous, except that permitting π 
 + to differ
−
 i  (R, θ)
from π  requires that they solve for p 
numerically rather than analytically.65 They
again assume a CARA utility function, and
functional forms for π  +  ( ⋅ , θ) and π  −( ⋅ , θ)
include a power function and that proposed
by Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992).66 In
each case, the estimate θ̂ ais not far from
what is obtained for the EU model, the probability weighting function for gains is slightly
convex but not significantly so, but the probability weighting function for losses is highly
and significantly concave, leading to a clear
rejection of EU.
Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) revisit the
favorite–longshot framing of the data as in
Griffith (1949) and Weitzman (1965), and
investigate whether it is driven by risk love
(increasing marginal utility) or by risk misperceptions (probability distortions). As in Ali
(1977), either model can fully explain data
on win bets. The fundamental insight used
for identification is that the so-estimated
models will have different implications for
bettors’ decisions over a wider choice set (as
suggested by Ali 1977), in particular for compound bets in the exacta, quinella, or trifecta
pools.67 Snowberg and Wolfers’s data cover
65 Given computing power at the time, they thus used
a small subset of the data and considered a more limited
set of models.
66 By assuming a CARA utility function, Jullien and
Salanié (2000) effectively assume that there is no diminishing sensitivity or loss aversion (see section 3.3). In particular, the estimates would be the same if u(aRi    , θ) and
u(−a, θ)were replaced with u
 (w + aRi    , θ)and u(w − a, θ).
67 An exacta is a bet on both which horse will come in
first and which will come in second. A quinella is a bet on
two horses to come in first and second in either order. A
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every horse race run in North America from
1992 to 2001, including the finishing position of each horse, the win odds on each
horse, and the realized payoffs for exactas,
quinellas, and trifectas. As in the prior literature, Snowberg and Wolfers take a representative-agent approach: they assume a
large number of identical bettors, where
each bets a fixed amount of $1 in each race
(or can choose not to bet), and bets that $1
on (at most) one horse. Hence, again the
market odds will be such that the utility of
all bets (and the utility of not betting) are
all the same.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First,
Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) use race results
to estimate how the win probability depends
on the odds. They pursue an approach similar to Weitzman (1965), first calculating the
empirical frequency of winners for each value
of odds Robserved in the data, and then using
Lowess smoothing to estimate a function
p̂ (R).68
Next, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010)
separately fit the EU model and the risk
misperception model to the estimated p
 ̂ (R)
function. For the EU model, they assume
that bettors’ beliefs correspond to p̂ (R), in
which case, the market equilibrium condition
implies
 p̂ (Ri  )u(w + Ri  ) + (1 − p̂ ( Ri  )) u(w − 1)  
   = u(w)   for all i = 1, … , n.
Normalizing 
w = 0
, normalizing utility to zero if the bet is lost (
u(−1)   = 0),
trifecta is a bet on which horse will come in first, which
second, and which third.
68 They actually estimate a smooth function for the rate
of return as a function of R, but since the rate of return is
equal to pR, this is equivalent to estimating a smooth function for the win probability p
 ̂ (R).

and n
 ormalizing utility to one if the bettor
chooses not to bet (u(0)   = 1), this becomes
1    ,
(12)  p̂ (Ri  ) u(Ri  ) = 1 ⇒ u( Ri  ) =  ____
p ̂ ( Ri  )

i = 1, … , n.
In other words, a utility function u
(R)  
= 1 /p̂ (R)perfectly fits the estimated p̂ (R)
function. The so-estimated u
 (R)is, not surprisingly, convex—as we have seen, explaining the favorite–longshot bias with an EU
model requires a risk-loving utility function.
While they prefer (and use below) this nonparametric estimate for u
 (R), they also argue
that a CARA utility function fits the data reasonably well.
For the risk-misperception model, they
assume that bettors have a linear utility
function u(x)   = x. Letting π
 (p)denote the
misperceived win probability associated
with objective win probability p
 , the market
equilibrium condition implies
 
π(p̂ (Ri  )) Ri    + (1 − π(p̂ (Ri  ))) (−1)   = 0
	  or

π(p̂ ( Ri  )) ( Ri    + 1)   = 1

for all i = 1, … , n.
Letting R̂ (p)denote the inverse of 
p̂ (R),
it follows that a risk-misperception function π(p)   = 1 / (R̂ (p)  + 1)perfectly fits the
estimated p̂ (R)function. The so-estimated
π(p)indicates significant overestimates of
small probabilities, exactly what is needed
to explain the favorite–longshot bias. Again,
while they prefer (and use below) this nonparametric estimate for π
 (p), they also argue
that a one-parameter probability weighting
function as in Prelec (1998) fits the data reasonably well.
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Finally, in step 3, having established that
either model can perfectly fit data on win
bets, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) turn to
compound bets. They (and we) outline their
approach only for exacta bets (in which the
bettor wagers that horse Awill come in first
and horse B
 will come in second); analogous
approaches are used for quinella and trifecta
bets. For exacta bets, they do not observe
the odds for all combinations of horses,
but rather only the odds for the winning
combination. Hence, they use the two estimated models from step 2 to generate, for
each race, model-predicted exacta odds Ê   AB
for the winning combination, and then compare those to the observed exacta odds E 
 AB.
In other words, they investigate which estimated model from step 2 best predicts the
observed exacta odds.
Letting p  B|Adenote the probability that
horse Bis second given that horse A wins,
the predicted exacta odds can be derived
much as in step 2:69
EU:
1
p A p  B|A  u(Ê   AB) = 1 ⇒ Ê   AB  = u  −1 ______
(  p A p  B|A  );
Risk Misperception:
π(p A)π(p  B|A)(Ê   AB  + 1)   = 1
1
  
   − 1.
⇒ Ê   AB  =  ___________
π(  p A)π( p  B|A)
For each race, p 
 A and π( p A) can be derived
from RA  as in step 2. The key question is
how to derive p 
 B|A and π( p  B|A). Snowberg
and Wolfers pursue two approaches, both
of which yield the same conclusions.
First, they use Harville’s (1973) formula,
69 The risk-misperception model here assumes that
bettors fail to reduce the compound lottery inherent in an
exacta—i.e., they do not use π
 ( p A p  B|A).
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which yields p  B|A  = p B  / (1 − p A) or π( p  B|A)
= π( p B) / (1 − π( p A)), where p B and π( p B)
can be derived from R
 B  as in step 2.70 Second,
they estimate p̂ ( RB    | RA  ) using a technique
analogous to how they estimate p̂ (R).
They compare models by computing the
mean absolute prediction error between E
 ̂   AB
and EA  Bfor each model. Using this metric,
they find that the estimated risk-misperception model better predicts observed
odds for exacta bets (and for quinella and
trifecta bets). The authors thus conclude
that their “results are more consistent with
the favorite–long shot bias being driven by
misperceptions rather than by risk love”
(p. 744).
6.2.2 Heterogeneity in Beliefs and
Preferences
Two recent papers—Gandhi and SerranoPadial (2015) and Chiappori et al. (2012)—
investigate the extent to which one can use
aggregate data on horse races to estimate
heterogeneity in beliefs and heterogeneity
in preferences. The key idea in both is that,
instead of assuming a representative bettor
who is indifferent between betting on all
horses in a race, it is assumed that heterogeneous bettors partition themselves across the
horses in a race based on either their beliefs
or their preferences. If one can observe how
bettors partition themselves across races with
different characteristics, one can draw inference on the distribution of heterogeneity.
Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2015) are
motivated by the favorite–longshot bias, and
the idea that belief heterogeneity could drive
it (as suggested by Ali 1977, theorem 2).
They develop a formal model of risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs, and
prove that such a model would generate a
favorite-longshot bias. Here, we focus on the
70 Under Harville’s model, the ratio of the probabilities that any two horses place second does not depend on
which of the other horses wins.
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latter part of the paper, where they estimate
the extent of belief heterogeneity.
Once again, a race consists of a house take
τ and an objective vector of win probabilities p ≡ ( p 1  ,   … , p n), and all bettors bet the
same fixed amount. Bettor tholds beliefs
φ  t  ≡ (φ  1t  ,   … , φ  nt), where beliefs are heterogeneous and thus some bettors have φ  t  ≠ p.
Letting Q
 (φ t  ; θ)denote a population distribution of φ
 t, the goal is to estimate the
vector of parameters θthat characterize Q.
Since bettors are risk neutral, bettor t bets
on the horse with the largest φ  it Ri  . Assuming
that Qis continuous, so that a measure zero
of bettors are indifferent between multiple
horses, any vector of odds R
 will cause bettors to partition themselves such that the
share betting on horse i is

which is the familiar form in the discrete-choice literature. Applying results
from that literature, for any continuous
P(ν  t; θ), one can translate any observed odds
Rinto a unique vector of model-implied
underlying probabilities p  ∗  (R, θ). One can
then set up a likelihood function exactly as in
Jullien and Salanié (2000).
The authors estimate this model—i.e.,
—using a sample of
they estimate P
(ν  t; θ)
more than 176,000 pari-mutuel races that
were collected from North American tracks
over 2003–06, consisting of more than
1,400,000 horse starts.72 Much as in the
discrete-choice literature, they assume that
P(ν  t; θ)takes a logistic form. However, they
permit a variance mixture of logistic functions. Specifically, they assume

	s i  = Pr  Q(φ  it Ri    > φ  jt Rj    for all j ≠ i).

P(ν  t; θ)   =   ∑    ∏    F( ν  it  | σ  m)   g(σ  m),
	

In equilibrium, odds must adjust such that the
shares implied by this bettor behavior correspond to the shares implied by the p
 ari-mutuel
pricing rule (equations (9) and (10)).
Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2015) had the
key insight that this market is isomorphic to
a discrete-choice horizontally differentiated
products market of the form studied by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Berry,
Gandhi, and Haile (2013).71 Specifically,
δ i + νi  t > 
φ  it Ri   > φ  jt Rj  is equivalent to 
δ j  + νjt   where δi   = log p i Ri   − log p 1 R1   and
ν it  = log ( p 1 / φ  1t) − log ( p i / φ  it). Hence,
instead of focusing on the population distribution Q(φt ; θ), they focus on the population distribution P(ν  t; θ). The market shares
can now be written as

where 
Fis a standard logistic distribution with variance σ 
m, and g(σ  m) is the
probability that the population variance

equals σ  m.73 They interpret σ  mto be a measure of belief heterogeneity for type m. The
authors report results for M = 1, 2, and 3.
A likelihood ratio test rejects the one-type
model in favor of the two-type model, while
adding a third type does not significantly
improve the log-likelihood. In the two-type
model, they estimate that 70 percent of the
population have a small σ = 0.028, while 30
percent have a large σ
 = 0.503. The authors
interpret the former group as having roughly
correct beliefs (informed traders), and they
interpret the latter group as having dispersed
beliefs (noise traders).74

	s i  = Pr  P(δ  i  + ν  it  > δ  j  + ν  jt  for all j ≠ i),

71 In an appendix, they describe how this approach can
be extended to permit risk-averse bettors.

m=1(i=2
M

n

)

72 As a preliminary step, the authors regress ex post
return on (log) market shares, and indeed find evidence of
the favorite–longshot bias in their data.
73 The authors don’t discuss how this functional-form
assumption translates into a distribution of the underlying
beliefs φ  t.
74 They also estimate a model with risk-averse bettors
who all have the same CARA utility function, and reach
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Finally, the authors do some additional
analysis to further buttress their argument
that belief heterogeneity is playing an
important role in this context. First, they use
their data to estimate a representative agent
model using the preferred specification of
Jullien and Salanié (2000), and they conclude
using a Vuong test that their belief-heterogeneity model is statistically better than the
representative agent model. Second, they
separately estimate their model on the subsamples of maiden and non-maiden races.
Maiden races are races in which participating horses have yet to win a single race, and
thus there is less handicapping information
about horses in maiden races than in nonmaiden races. Their estimates suggest stable
proportions of informed versus noise traders across the two types of races, but lower
variance estimates for each type of trader in
the non-maiden races. This result is exactly
what one might expect if belief heterogeneity were playing an important role in this
environment.
Chiappori et al. (2012) take the opposite
approach to heterogeneity: they assume
that bettors have correct (and thus homogeneous) beliefs, and estimate a model with
heterogeneity in preferences. Yet again, a
race consists of a house take τ and an objective vector of win probabilities p, where the
authors label the horses in each race such that
p 1  > ⋯ > p n. They assume a continuum of
bettors who all have beliefs that correspond
to p and who all bet the same fixed amount.
Bettors differ in their utility function,
V(R, p, θ), which is the utility from betting on
a horse that has odds Rand win probability
p. The parameter θcaptures heterogeneity.
The authors do not put any parametric
structure on V, but rather assume that it satisfies a few simple properties. They assume
that V
 is continuous and increasing in R and
much the same conclusion about the nature of belief
heterogeneity.
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p
. They assume that 
θis unidimensional
(i.e., θis a scalar), and without loss of generality that it is distributed uniformly on the
interval [0, 1]. Most importantly, V
  satisfies
a single-crossing property with respect to θ:
for any two gambles (R, p) and (R′ , p′ ) with
p′   < p, if, for some θ, V(R, p, θ)   ≤ V(R′ , p′ , θ),
then for all θ′   > θ, V(R, p, θ′ ) < V(R′ , p′ , θ′ ).
Hence, θcan be interpreted as a taste for
risk, where the larger θ is, the more a bettor
is prone to prefer horses with a lower probability but higher odds.75
Given this structure, for any fixed V
 , p,
and R such that money is bet on every horse
(which must hold in equilibrium), bettors partition themselves by θ: there exists
0 = θ  0  < θ  1  < ⋯ < θ  n  = 1such that bettors with θ ∈ ( θ  0  , θ  1)bet on horse 1, bettors
with θ ∈ ( θ  1  , θ  2)bet on horse 2, and so on
until bettors with θ ∈ ( θ  n−1  , θ  n) bet on horse
n. In other words, bettors with the lowest
θs, who are most averse to risk, bet on the
horse with the largest win probabilities,
and bettors with larger and larger θs bet on
horses with smaller and smaller win probabilities. It follows that market shares as a
function of odds R satisfy s i  = θ  i  − θ  i−1. In
equilibrium, odds must adjust such that the
shares implied by this bettor behavior equal
the shares implied by the pari-mutuel pricing rule (equations (9) and (10)).
The authors prove that, for any V
  satisfying their assumptions, for each race (p, τ)
there exists a unique set of equilibrium odds
R, and moreover for any observed equilibrium odds R, there is a unique vector of win
probabilities p that could generate those
odds. Finally, the authors prove that, if one
observes the relationship p(R)
, one can
identify the utility function V
 up to an affine
75 This single-crossing assumption is satisfied for an
EU model with CARA utility or with CRRA utility. For
non-EU models, it can be satisfied, though additional
restrictions are required. In particular, heterogeneity has
to remain unidimensional.

550

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (June 2018)

transformation. Hence, in principle one can
nonparametrically identify V
 , and the extent
of heterogeneity via V
   ’s dependence on θ ,
from the aggregate pricing data.
To relate the nonparametric utility function V
 to various underlying models of preferences, the authors focus on a feature of V

known as the “normalized fear of ruin”:
p Vp  
	
NF(R, p, θ)   =  _____   ___   (R, p, θ).
R + 1 VR  
Different models of risk preferences have
different implications for N
 F(R, p, θ)—e.g.,
under EU it is independent of p
 . To estimate NF, they propose a two-step procedure. First, they use empirically observed
outcomes to nonparametrically estimate the
function p i  (R).76 Second, with the function
p i  (R)in hand, they are able to estimate the
NFindex at each observation in the data.77
They implement this approach using a data
set of more than 53,000 thoroughbred races
in the United States from 2001 to 2004. They
then test how well different models of risk
preferences can explain the variation in the
estimated NFindex. Of the models considered, a heterogenous non-EU model with
non-additive probability weights, in which
the estimated probability weighting function is concave and then convex, performs
best.
The approach in Chiappori et al. (2012)
has limitations. In particular, the assumption of unidimensional heterogeneity that
76 This step is analogous to the approach in Weitzman
(1965) and Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), except that they
estimate how the probability of horse iwinning depends on
the full vector of odds R, as opposed to merely depending
on Ri  .
77 Here, they do not pursue a maximum-likelihood
approach as in Jullien and Salanié (2000) and Gandhi and
Serrano-Padial (2015). Rather, they focus on one particular
implication of V
 that can be non-parametrically identified
from p(R), and which can be used to compute NF. For
details, see the paper.

satisfies the single-crossing property is quite
restrictive for non-EU models. Also, their
estimation approach is not as straightforward
to implement as other approaches in this literature. That said, their intuition for how to
identify heterogeneity in preferences from
aggregate data is quite appealing.
6.3 Consumption, Asset Returns, and Labor
Supply Data
A number of studies use macroeconomic
data to estimate risk preferences. Such
studies typically use a representative-agent
life-cycle model, and use aggregate data
to estimate a parameter of that model that
reflects the representative agent’s degree of
risk aversion. Here, we describe a few seminal
papers in this literature, focusing on papers
in which a major focus is the estimation of a
risk parameter. As we highlight below, however, the parameter estimated differs across
papers.
Hansen and Singleton (1983) use data on
consumption and asset returns to estimate a
life-cycle consumption model. They study a
single-good economy of identical, infinitely
lived agents with time-additive EU preferences. The representative agent in this economy chooses a stochastic consumption plan
  to maximize
{ c t  }  ∞
t=0
∞

(13)	E 0[  ∑  β  t  u(c t)], 
t=0

where E0  is the expectation conditional on
information available in period zero, β
 > 0 is
a discount factor, and u
 ( c t) is the per-period
utility function (which is monthly in the estimation). The representative agent faces the
sequence of budget constraints
(14)	c t  + p  ′t   x  t+1  ≤ (p  t  + d  t)′ x  t, 
where x  tis a vector of the agent’s holdings of
nassets in period t , p  tis the vector of prices
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of the nassets net of any distributions, and
d  tis the vector of distributions in period t.78
Hansen and Singleton (1983) assume a
    − 1)/
CRRA utility function 
u( c t) = ( c t1−ρ
(1 − ρ), and they estimate the coefficient of
relative risk aversion ρ. In other words, they
estimate utility curvature over per-period
consumption. Given this functional form,
the first-order necessary conditions for the
maximization of (13) subject to (14) are given
by the Euler equations,
 −ρ

  ct+1
  ]  = 1, i = 1, … , n, 
(15) E t[β(___
)  Rit+1
 t 
c 

where Et  is the expectation conditional on
information available in period t and Ri  t+1 
  )/ p itis the one-period return
= (p it+1  + dit+1
on asset i.
By assuming, inter alia, that the joint distribution of consumption and asset returns
is log-normal, Hansen and Singleton (1983)
are able to obtain ML estimates of ρ
  and
βusing monthly US data for the period
February 1959 through December 1978.79
In general, their estimates of 
ρ range
between zero and two, and their estimates
of the discount factor β
 are less than but
close to unity. Perhaps more importantly,
however, they perform various chi-square
and likelihood-ratio tests that provide substantial evidence against the model. Of
course, these tests are joint tests of the
model’s several restrictions, including the
preference assumptions (identical agents,
EU preferences, time additivity, CRRA
utility, exponential discounting, etc.) and
78 In Hansen and Singleton (1983), the right-hand
side of the budget constraint also includes a term explicitly measuring the agent’s labor income in period t. This
term can be supressed, however, without loss of generality
(Epstein and Zin 1989, 1991, p. 267).
79 For aggregate consumption, they use seasonally
adjusted real consumption at the monthly level. They
estimate the model using several different monthly asset
return series.

the distributional assumption (jointly
log-normally distributed consumption and
asset returns), making it impossible to say
which restrictions are being rejected. For
this reason, the authors lay out a dual plan
of pursuing both “models with more general specifications of preferences and distribution-free methods of estimation and
inference” (Hansen and Singleton 1983,
p. 264).
In Hansen and Singleton (1982), the
authors progress their plan to pursue
distribution-free methods of estimation
and inference.80 They develop a generalized instrumental variables procedure
for estimating the parameters of model
(13)–(14) and implement their procedure using the same monthly data on
consumption and asset returns used in
Hansen and Singleton (1983). In brief,
they first use the Euler equations (15) to
generate a set of population orthogonality
conditions,

⎢⎜

⎡⎛
(16) 	E    

 −ρ

c 

c t+1
___
 ) 
⎣⎝β (  c t 

⋮

−ρ

⎟ ⎥

⎞

  ct+1
β (___
 t 
 )   R1  t+1  − 1

⎤

   ⊗ z  t   = 0,

 Rn  t+1  − 1⎠

⎦

where Eis unconditional expectation and the
vector of instruments z  t comprises lagged
    , c t+1  / c t)′. They
values of 
( 
R 1t+1  , …, Rnt+1
then use the sample analog of the orthogonality conditions to construct a generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator of
the model parameters. The GMM estimates
of ρand β
 are similar to the ML estimates
reported in Hansen and Singleton (1983).
Chi-square tests again provide evidence
against the model, which here may be interpreted as direct evidence against the model’s
preference assumptions.
80 Hansen and Singleton (1982) was published before,
but apparently written after, Hansen and Singleton (1983).
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The rejection by Hansen and Singleton
(1982, 1983) of the standard-preference
assumptions is echoed in the subsequent literature on the equity premium puzzle (Mehra
and Prescott 1985).81 In their famous paper,
Mehra and Prescott consider a variation of
the standard model studied by Hansen and
Singleton in which there are two assets: a
risky equity security and a risk-free debt security. Unlike Hansen and Singleton, however,
Mehra and Prescott do not estimate the model’s preference parameters. Instead, they calibrate the model’s n
 on-preference parameters
so that the population mean, variance, and
autocorrelation of consumption growth match
their corresponding sample values for the US
economy between 1889 and 1978. They then
derive analytical expressions for the expected
returns on the equity and risk-free securities,
R  e and R  f, in terms of the model’s preference parameters, ρand β. Restricting ρ ≤ 10
, β ≤ 1, and R  f  ≤ 0.04(more than four times
the average return on the three-month
Treasury bill during the sample period), they
find that the maximum equity premium (
R  e  − R  f  ) that is consistent with the model
is less than one percent. In contrast, in their
data, the historical equity premium (the difference between the average annual returns
on the S&P 500 and the three-month Treasury
bill) was more than six percent.
Motivated in part by the poor empirical performance of the standard model in
Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) and
Mehra and Prescott (1985), and in part by
concurrent developments in the microeconomics literature on non-EU preferences,
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) pursue a
model with a more general specification of
preferences.82 The key innovation of their
81 For a survey of the literature on the equity premium
puzzle, see Kocherlakota (1996). See also Siegel and Thaler
(1997). Campbell (2003) summarizes the larger literature
on asset price puzzles in macroeconomics.
82 Weil (1989, 1990) takes a parallel path.

model is that it disentangles the representative agent’s degree of risk aversion from his
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In
the standard model, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constrained to equal the
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. As a result, an agent with standard preferences that is very averse to risk
must also have a very strong preference
for consumption smoothing. However, this
is what makes the equity premium a puzzle: the high degree of risk aversion that is
required to explain the historical equity premium implies an implausibly low elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, given the historical rate of consumption growth. Accordingly,
Epstein and Zin investigate whether a
model that delinks preferences over risk and
intertemporal substitution can outperform

the standard model.
In Epstein and Zin’s model, the representative agent’s utility in period tis defined
recursively as
1 
 __
___
  ς   ς

1−ρ
  ]  1−ρ)  ]    , 
(17) U t  = [(1 − β) c tς    + β (Et   [Ut+1

subject to the sequence of budget constraints given by (14). In this formulation,
ς = 1 − (1 / σ) where σ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, 
β > 0is a discount factor, and ρ
 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Hence, as in Hansen
and Singleton (1982, 1983), in terms of risk
preferences Epstein and Zin (1991) estimate utility curvature over per-period consumption, though with a different functional
form.
The Euler equations that characterize the
first-order necessary conditions of the optimal consumption path are
  ct+1
(18) E t[β (___
 t 
 ) 
c 

 θ(ς−1)
θ−1
  ]  = 1,
( m  t+1)   Rit+1

i = 1, …, n, 
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where θ = (1 − ρ)/ ς and m t+1  = [( p  t+1  + 
d  t+1)′ x  t+1  ] / p  ′t   x  t+1is the one-period return
on the agent’s asset holdings in period t.
Observe that when 
ρ = 1 / σ, and thus
ς = 1 − ρ, the Euler equations (18) reduce
to (15).
Following the GMM procedure of Hansen
and Singleton (1982), Epstein and Zin
(1991) estimate the model using monthly US
data for the period February 1959 through
December 1986. They estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ
 to be close
to one and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution σ
 to be less than one. Moreover,
Wald and likelihood ratio tests of the restriction ρ = 1 / σgenerally reject the standard
model. That said, Epstein and Zin’s (1989,
1991) model does not resolve the equity premium puzzle, in part reflected by the fact
that the discount factor βis often estimated
to be greater than one.83
In a completely different approach, Chetty
(2006) analyzes risk preferences using data
on labor supply. Chetty’s basic insight is that
the wage elasticity of labor supply, which
has been estimated in numerous studies
in labor economics, provides information
about the curvature of the marginal utility of
consumption.
Chetty (2006) begins with a standard life-cycle labor-supply model in which a representative agent chooses a path of consumption
  and labor { lt    }  Tt=1
  to maximize
{ c t  }  Tt=1
U( c 1  , … , c T  , l1    , … , lT  )subject to the budget
constraint
  
p 1 c 1  + ⋯ + p T c T 
  = y + w( α1   l1    + ⋯ + αT   lT  ),

83 Another generalization of the standard EU model
that features prominently in the macro-finance literature
is the model with habit formation (e.g., Abel 1990, 1999;
Constantinides 1990; Campbell and Cochrane 1999).

where p tis the price of consumption in
period t, yis unearned income at time 0, and
wαt  is the wage in period t. Chetty chooses to
work with the associated indirect utility function u
(c, l)
, where 
c ≡ p 1 c 1  + ⋯ + p T c T
represents lifetime consumption expenditures, l ≡ α  1 l1    + ⋯ + αT   lT   represents lifetime labor supply, and the budget constraint
becomes c = y + wl
. He then studies the
coefficient of relative risk aversion in u —
that is,
− u cc  (c, l) c
   .
	
γ ≡  _________
u c  (c, l)
In other words, whereas Hansen and
Singleton (1982, 1983) and Epstein and
Zin (1989, 1991) study curvature of the
per-period utility function over per-period
consumption, Chetty studies curvature of
the indirect utility function with respect to
lifetime consumption (or, equivalently, lifetime wealth).
Given this model, the first order condition
with respect to labor is given by
	
wu c  (y + wl, l)   = − u  l  (y + wl, l) .
Chetty (2006) shows that, with some implicit
differentiation and algebraic manipulation,
one can derive that
ε  l, y

wl    ____   +  1 +  __   ε    ,
	
γ = − (1 +  __
y ) ε  l  c, w (
) u c, l
y
wl

where ε  l, yis the income elasticity of labor
supply, ε  l  c, wis the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply, and ε  u c, l is the elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption with
respect to labor (which captures any complementarity between consumption and labor
supply). Hence, if one has estimates of these
three elasticities along with values for y  and
wl, one can obtain an estimate for γ.
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In his empirical implementation, Chetty
(2006) takes advantage of a large number of
existing studies that contain estimates of the
two needed wage elasticities along with measures of y and w
 l(in most cases he uses the
sample means of yand wl). An estimate of
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to labor is harder to
come by, but he appeals to evidence on consumption responses to job loss, disability, and
retirement to conclude that this elasticity is,
at most, 0.15. Hence, for each existing study
with estimates for the needed wage elasticities, Chetty provides the corresponding
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ under
an assumption of ε  u c, l  = 0and of ε  u c, l  = 0.15.
Overall, much as in Hansen and Singleton
(1982, 1983) and Epstein and Zin (1989,
1991), he finds only modest risk aversion—
the average estimate for γis 0.71 in the former case and 0.97 in the latter case.
7.

Directions for Future Research

In this section we discuss a number of
directions for, and important questions to be
addressed in, future research.
7.1 Consistency across Contexts
A common assumption in economics is
that risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. Under EU, for instance, the
implication is that multiple risky choices
by the same agent should reflect the same
degree of risk aversion (or risk loving). If
this assumption is correct, then estimates
of risk preferences derived from choices
in one context can be used to understand
and make predictions about the behavior of
households in other contexts. Assessing the
empirical validity of the stability assumption is a difficult task. Moreover, it is quite
possible that risk preferences are stable
across a certain set of contexts, but not others. While there exist a few papers on this

issue, which we survey below, more work is
needed.
In an early paper, Wolf and Pohlman (1983)
compare the risk preferences of a single person—a dealer in US government securities—
in two contexts; a hypothetical gambling
context and an actual investment context.
For both cases, they assume that the dealer
is an EU maximizer with HARA utility. In the
gambling context, Wolf and Pohlman recover
the utility parameters from the dealer’s direct
assessments of six hypothetical lotteries. In
the investment context, they recover the
same parameters from the dealer’s bid decisions over a series of twenty-eight Treasury
bill auctions conducted during a twenty-week
interval in 1976 along with the dealer’s own
subjective forecasts of the distribution of
short-term returns. They find that the dealer
was about four times more risk averse in the
actual bid decisions than he was for the hypothetical gambles, leading them to conclude
that people’s “degree of risk aversion may
depend on the specific context in which their
choices are made” (p. 849).
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum
(2011) investigate the stability hypothesis
by examining the choices of 702 households
across three insurance coverages: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. As in BMOT, they observe for each choice
the full menu of premium–deductible combinations, the household’s chosen deductible, and the household’s claim rate for that
coverage (estimated from claims data and
demographics). Households are assumed to
have subjective beliefs that correspond to
their coverage-specific claim rates and to be
EU maximizers with an NTD utility function. The authors then focus on the stability
within a household of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion r.
Specifically, each choice that a household
makes implies an interval [  r,  r  ̅] such that
¯ that choice.
any r ∈ [  r,  r  ̅]is consistent with
¯
For instance, if a household chooses a $250
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deductible on home insurance, there exists
an rsuch that any r <  rwould imply the
¯
household
should choose¯a deductible larger
than $250, and there exists an  r  ̅ such that
any r >  r  ̅ would imply the household should
choose a deductible smaller than $250. The
authors ask, for each household, whether the
three intervals implied by its three choices
intersect. If so, any r contained in the intersection can rationalize the household’s
choices (i.e., the household might have stable risk preferences); if not, no r can rationalize the household’s choices.
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum
(2011) find that the hypothesis of stable risk
preferences is rejected by the data. The three
intervals intersect for only 23 percent of
households, which is rather low considering
that, according to the authors’ calculations,
14 percent of households would have overlapping intervals even if households were
randomly assigned their deductible choices.
The authors pursue several more sophisticated approaches to demonstrate that the
conclusion of limited stability is robust. The
authors further point out that the major
inconsistency seems to come from households tending to exhibit greater risk aversion
in their home deductible choices than they
do in their auto deductible choices.
Einav et al. (2012) also study the stability
of risk preferences, although in contrast to
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011),
they focus on the null of no stability, and assess
the extent to which there is a domain-general
component to risk preferences. They use
data on the benefits choices of 12,752 Alcoa
employees in six contexts: health insurance,
drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term
disability insurance, long-term disability
insurance, and 401(k) investments.
Einav et al. (2012) take two complementary approaches in their analysis. First, they
take a model-free approach in which they
rank by risk the options within each context
and compute the pairwise rank correlations
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in the employees’ choices across contexts.
They find that an employee’s choice in
every context is positively correlated with
his or her choice in every other context, and
thus conclude that they can reject the null
hypothesis of no domain-general component
of risk preferences. Second, they take a model-based approach that is conceptually similar to the approach in Barseghyan, Prince,
and Teitelbaum (2011). They specify an EU
model that permits both an individual-specific coefficient of risk aversion and a context-specific shift in risk preferences (that
does not vary across employees). The latter
effect is modeled in a stylized, reduced-form
way that does not really correspond to any
underlying model of risk preferences. They
then choose the context-specific shifts that
maximize the number of employees for
whom there exists an individual-specific
coefficient of risk aversion that, when combined with the context-specific shifts, can
explain their behavior across all six contexts.
With this approach, they can fully rationalize the behavior of roughly 30 percent
of employees across all six contexts, which
they take to be further evidence that there
is a domain-general component of risk preferences (though they acknowledge that the
size of the context-specific shifts “suggests
that the implied levels of risk aversion exhibited may be very different across domains, or
that other effects, such as framing or probability weighting, are particularly important in
these contexts” (p. 2634)).
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum
(2016), discussed in section 5.2, demonstrate
a close connection between rank correlation
of choices and stability of risk preferences
under a probability distortion model. They
find that stability of risk preferences cannot
be rejected for roughly five in six households whose choices are rationalizable by
the model. They then document that households’ deductible choices are rank correlated
across lines of coverage, echoing the finding
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by Einav et al. (2012), and they show that it is
stable households who are driving these rank
correlations.
Moving forward, whether in an EU or a
non-EU framework, it would be natural to
consider models of risk preferences that have
both a permanent (domain-general) and an
idiosyncratic (context-specific) component.
As a simple example, in an EU model with
CRRA utility, one might permit that household i’s coefficient of risk aversion in choice
cis given by ρ  ic  = ρ  ̅ i  + ε  ic, where the ρ  ̅ i is
constant across all of i’s choices, while ε  ic is
drawn separately for each choice that household ifaces. With appropriate data—and in
particular with enough observations for each
household—one could estimate the extent
and importance of each.
7.2 Combining Experimental and Field
Data
A special case of the question of consistency across contexts is the question of
consistency between behavior in laboratory experiments and behavior in the field.
Laboratory research (and, to some extent,
also survey research) represents a context in
which a rich set of questions can be asked
of each individual, and thus a precise estimate of an individual’s risk preferences is,
in principle, possible. An open question is
how useful such estimates are for real-world
applications.
In fact, there is research that starts to
address this question. Most of this research
uses surveys to obtain both a measure of risk
aversion and self-reports of field behavior
for the same agents. For instance, Barsky
et al. (1997) use data from the 1992 Health
and Retirement Study. This survey included
two hypothetical (binary) choices between
gambles, framed as whether one would
give up a safe job for an alternative job that
is risky. Respondents are categorized into
four risk groups based on their answers to
the two questions. The survey also collects

s
elf-reports on various risky behaviors.
Barsky et al. find that the categorical measure
of risk preferences is indeed correlated with
the likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking, not having
insurance, choosing risky employment, and
holding risky assets. For similar analyses,
see Guiso and Paiella (2006, 2008) using the
Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income
and Wealth, and Dohmen et al. (2011) using
the German Socio-Economic Panel. Also, in
a development context, Liu (2013) and Liu
and Huang (2013) study how risk preferences elicited in a (field) laboratory setting
correlate, respectively, with the adoption
of new crops and the usage of pesticide by
Chinese farmers.
An alternative approach is to gather experimental and field data on arguably the same
or very similar choices and then investigate
the extent to which risk preferences estimated on experimental data correspond
to risk preferences estimated on field data.
One paper that follows this approach is
Barseghyan, O’Donoghue, and Xu (2015).
In an online survey, subjects are presented
with three deductible choices for propertyinsurance coverages. The choice menus are
constructed to match closely the deductible options and prices associated with specific households in the field data used by
BMOT. The key difference is that agents in
the laboratory are provided with their latent
(objective) claim probabilities, while BMOT
assume households’ beliefs correspond to
observed claim probabilities.
Qualitatively, the findings of Barseghyan,
O’Donoghue, and Xu (2015) confirm the patterns documented with field data (BMOT;
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum
2016): probability distortions can rationalize
the behavior of the vast majority of households, while the curvature of the utility
function alone cannot do so. The estimated
(average) probability distortion function is
increasing in the relevant range and e xhibits
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significant overweighting. Quantitatively,
there are interesting differences between
the laboratory and field findings. There is
more overweighting in the laboratory than in
the field, as well as more heterogeneity.
Going forward, we envision more work
emerging in this area, as more field data
become available, and researchers are
granted ways to design surveys that can reach
(a subset of) subjects in the field data (e.g., as
in Handel and Kolstad 2015).
7.3 Direct Measurement of Beliefs
When estimating risk preferences from
field data, a researcher typically faces a fundamental identification problem: observed
choices are often consistent with many combinations of decision makers’ risk preferences and their subjective expectations about
various outcome probabilities. This problem
is typically solved in one of two ways. One
approach is to assume individuals hold objective expectations. In the insurance context,
this translates into assuming that individuals know the objective claim probabilities
or the objective health shocks distribution,
and in the betting context this translates
into assuming that individuals know horses’
objective odds of winning races. The analysis
then focuses on identification and estimation
of risk preferences. A second approach is to
assume that individuals are risk neutral, and
the analysis focuses on identification and
estimation of subjective beliefs.84
A different and promising approach for
solving this identification problem is to measure probabilistic expectations directly, as
advocated in Manski (2004). For example,
one may elicit subjective beliefs on the likelihood of a claim with questions such as: “What
84 A third approach is to assume more structure in the
model of risk preferences. For instance, if one imposes
EU, which in particular assumes that whatever decision
weights are applied to outcomes must correspond to subjective beliefs, then, with appropriate data, one can identify both the utility function and subjective beliefs.
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do you think is the percent chance that you
will experience an auto collision claim within
the next twelve months?” An important
aspect of this approach is that expectations
are not elicited in qualitative form (e.g., by
asking individuals how likely to occur an
event is, with options “very,” “fairly,” “not
too,” or “not at all” likely), but in quantitative
numerical form (e.g., on a scale out of 100).
An extensive literature demonstrates that
respondents are willing and able to provide
this information in probabilistic format.
Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009) survey these
findings in connection with data elicited
in developed countries, while Delavande
(2014) does the same in connection with data
elicited in developing countries. The findings include, inter alia, that there is substantial heterogeneity in beliefs (at least in the
contexts analyzed so far), and that elicited
beliefs correlate with individuals’ observable
characteristics similarly to how actual outcomes do; see, e.g., Dominitz (1998) and
Hurd and McGarry (2002). While it is not
possible to evaluate directly whether the
reported expectations are in fact those that
respondents truly hold (because there cannot be validation data for this information),
numerous studies in different contexts have
shown that, when asked about questions
that are relevant to their lives, respondents
give internally consistent answers. Examples
include Dominitz and Manski (1997), who
study individuals’ income expectations, and
Manski and Straub (2000), who analyze individuals’ expectations of their job security, in
both cases analyzing data from the Survey of
Economic Expectations. Manski (2004, sections 5 and 6) summarizes their findings and
the findings of many other studies.
For the literature on estimating risk preferences in the field, using data on subjective
expectations in place of objective probabilities seems a promising approach for future
work. Indeed, in other contexts, probabilistic expectations data have already been
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used to enrich econometric analysis of field
data, including retirement behavior (e.g.,
Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004; van
der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008), criminal
behavior (e.g., Lochner 2007), contraceptive choices and updating of beliefs on contraceptive effectiveness (e.g., Delavande
2008a, 2008b), and schooling choices (e.g.,
Giustinelli 2016 and Wiswall and Zafar
2015).85
7.4 Assumptions about Mental Accounting
As we discuss in section 5.1.1, in order to
estimate risk preferences in a field context,
one must make assumptions about how the
typically complex field context is translated
into concrete choice data that can be used
to estimate risk preferences. Such a step is,
of course, part of most economic analyses—
economics is all about developing simplified
models that capture the essence of a field
context of interest. However, a second possible justification for such assumptions is that
the agents themselves transform—and simplify—a choice situation in their own minds
before making a decision. This type of mental operation on the part of agents is often
labeled “mental accounting,” and thus we
refer to these assumptions as mental accounting assumptions. An important agenda for
future research is to pay more careful attention to these assumptions and investigate
directly the impact of such assumptions on
estimates of risk preferences.
An important dimension on which one
must make a mental accounting assumption
is how broadly versus narrowly households
bracket their decisions. On one extreme,
households could bracket all their decisions together into one grand “life” decision—indeed, theoretical economic models
are often written in this way. On the other
85 Probabilistic expectations data have also been used to
enrich experimental analyses, for example, by Nyarko and
Schotter (2002) and Dominitz and Hung (2009).

extreme, households could bracket very narrowly and evaluate each decision in isolation
from all others. There are also many possibilities in between.
In fact, virtually all papers that estimate
risk preferences implicitly—and occasionally
explicitly—assume very narrow bracketing.
They estimate risk preferences reflected in
one particular choice in isolation from how
that choice might interact with the many
other choices that households make. In most
cases, narrow bracketing is assumed merely
to help the researcher. If one has data on
only one decision per household, it is hard
to assume anything other than narrow bracketing. Even when one has data on multiple
decisions per household, it can be computationally burdensome to collect them all
together into one grand decision.86 There
may, however, be some psychological realism to the assumption of narrow bracketing.
Indeed, there is a literature that suggests that
when people make multiple choices, they frequently do not assess the consequences in an
integrated way, but rather tend to make each
choice in isolation (e.g., Read, Loewenstein,
and Rabin 1999).
In future research, it is worth investigating more carefully how broadly households
bracket their decisions. In simple terms,
we need to understand whether estimates
of risk preferences are biased by incorrect
assumptions about bracketing. Even beyond
this, if households do in fact bracket multiple decisions together, then they are choosing between more complex lotteries and, as
highlighted in section 4, this might permit
one to separately identify multiple sources
of aversion to risk. Indeed, Barseghyan et al.
(2013a) propose exactly this approach.
86 For instance, if one assumed daily bracketing at a
horse track, and if on any day the track holds ten races with
eight horses in each, then there are 8 
 10 possible lotteries
that one could choose (and even this is restricting attention
to win bets and ignoring any dynamics associated with basing later bets on earlier results).
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Another aspect of bracketing is that, in
many analyses, researchers treat what is
really a dynamic choice as a static choice.
Perhaps the best example is research on
insurance choices. When people choose an
insurance deductible, this is really part of a
dynamic problem where they are choosing
the budget constraints they’ll face in the
future as a function of intervening events.
Framed this way, it becomes clear that a
major confound in insurance analyses is a
fear of future liquidity constraints. If having
to pay a $1,000 deductible will leave a household with little liquidity to spend on other
needs, that household might choose a lower
deductible not because of risk aversion with
regard to lifetime wealth, but rather because
of fear of short-term liquidity issues.87 The
literature using macroeconomic data performs better on this dimension, as it explicitly
incorporates the dynamic life-cycle problems
that households face. Nonetheless, even that
literature tends to abstract away from household-specific details such as short-run liquidity constraints.
A second dimension on which one must
make a mental accounting assumption is
what options enter a household’s consideration set—that is, what options does a household take to be in its choice set. Because
estimates of risk preferences can depend on
what options are considered but not chosen,
assumptions about the consideration set can
alter estimates. To illustrate, consider a stylized example: Suppose we observe an individual in a casino who chooses to bet $10 on
BLACK in roulette (on a typical roulette wheel
that has both 0 and 00). This choice yields
a risky lottery (+$10, 18/38 ; −$10, 20/38)
that has an expected value of 

− $0.526.
87 Even relatively wealthy households can face short-run
liquidity concerns if they hold a large share of their wealth
in illiquid assets. See Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014)
for evidence on the prevalence of such “wealthy hand-tomouth” households.
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This person could have also bet $10 on #1,
which instead would yield a riskier lottery
(+$360, 1/38 ; −$10, 37/38)that has a larger
expected value of −
 $0.263. If we estimated,
for example, an EU model focusing on the
fact that the person chose to bet on BLACK
rather than bet on #1, we would conclude
that the person is risk averse, and we could
infer a lower bound on the magnitude of this
risk aversion. However, if instead we estimated an EU model focusing on the fact that
the person chose to bet on BLACK rather
than to not bet at all, we would instead conclude that the person is risk loving, and we
could infer a lower bound on the magnitude
of this risk lovingness.
The intuition of this example extends
almost immediately to research that estimates risk preferences using data from horse
races. In such analyses, one must make an
assumption about whether the option not
to bet is included in the consideration set.
Because the expected return on most horses
is negative, including the option not to bet
in the consideration set will yield estimates
of risk preferences that are more risk loving.88 But this issue also applies to property
insurance. When estimating preferences
from deductible choices, one might wonder
whether households consider the possibility
of not insuring at all, and also whether they
turn down any insurance options from other
firms that are not in the data set. In future
research, it is worth investigating more carefully the determinants and importance of
consideration sets.
A third dimension on which one must
make a mental accounting assumption is what
are the possible outcomes that h
 ouseholds
consider. To illustrate, consider property
insurance. When researchers estimate risk
88 This issue is mostly solved if one estimates utility
 onparametrically, as in Snowberg and Wolfers (2010),
n
where the estimated utility for not betting has no impact
on the estimated utility for winning or losing money.
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preferences using data on property insurance, they typically assume that households
only consider the possibility of incurring no
loss or a single loss during the policy period.
However, in principle, one might incur two,
three, or even more losses during a policy
period. If so, then the set of lotteries from
which households are choosing are different. The assumption of zero or one loss is
often made for simplicity, but again it could
reflect a psychological realism, as people
seem to have a hard time imagining and
accounting for all the possibilities that could
occur in life. This is especially true in more
complex domains, such as health insurance,
where it seems quite likely that households
approach decisions with a simplified conceptualization of all the possible outcomes
that might occur.
Moving forward, we think it important
that the literature considers more carefully
and more directly these and other mental
accounting assumptions when estimating
risk preferences. Such assumptions can matter under EU, and they become even more
important under RDEU and other more
complex models of risk preferences.
7.5 Concluding Thoughts
The literature on identification and estimation of risk preferences using field data
has improved a lot over the years, especially
in the past decade. As more and more forms
of field data become available, we expect
the literature will continue to blossom, and
we hope our analysis in this review will help
frame the development of the literature.
In particular, we have highlighted a
number of important dimensions on which
researchers must make some key choices.
In looking for field contexts, one must
think through the trade-offs associated with
individual versus aggregate data, as well
as those associated with studying simple
versus complex choices. In developing a
model of how individuals make choices,

researchers must make three broad categories of assumptions: (i) assumptions about
how the modeler—and perhaps the agents
themselves—transform and simplify the
real-world choice situation into a well-defined choice; (ii) assumptions about agents’
subjective beliefs, the extent to which they
correspond to objective beliefs, and the
extent of heterogeneity; and (iii) assumptions about the possible sources of aversion
to risk. Moreover, when one uses aggregate
data, there is a fourth category of assumptions: (iv) assumptions about the nature of
market forces. Our analysis has highlighted
the importance of all of these dimensions,
and indeed, our discussion of directions for
future research in this section suggests yet
new ways to approach many of these dimensions. There clearly is much to be done, and
we look forward to watching it all evolve.
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